Indiana Law Journal
Volume 77

Issue 4

Article 4

Fall 2002

"United We Stand": Managing Choice-of- Law Problems in
September-11-Based Toxic Torts Through Federal Substantive
Mass- Tort Law
Kenneth G. Kubes
Indiana University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Kubes, Kenneth G. (2002) ""United We Stand": Managing Choice-of- Law Problems in September-11-Based
Toxic Torts Through Federal Substantive Mass- Tort Law," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 77 : Iss. 4 , Article 4.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol77/iss4/4

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law
Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @
Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
rvaughan@indiana.edu.

"United We Stand": Managing Choice-ofLaw Problems in September-l1-Based Toxic
Torts Through Federal Substantive MassTort Law
KENNETH G. KuBEs"
I am more concerned about the long-term physical... problems we face. My
two sons spent the night of September 1 th in the lobby of a downtown hotel.
I am extremely worried about the exposure they got to harmful substances in
the air. They got additional exposure when the mayor of New York city [sic]
had us move back home on 09/23/01, a date manynow consider to have been
to [sic] early. As a patent, I will have to worry about this each day of my life.
Once we have attended the needs of the dead, we hope that you watch out
for the needs of the living victims with long-term issues yet to surface.
INTRODUCTION
On September 11, 2001, horrific acts of terror claimed the lives of nearly 3000
innocent victims. Countless other victims sustained nonlethal physical injuries. Just

days after the attacks, Congress passed legislation that sought to compensate these
victims and their families for their injuries and losses.2 In the process, however,
Congress failed to recognize another legitimate-if less identifiable-group of
victims.,
As the introductory comment suggests, Congress failed to consider that the release
of toxic substances from the World Trade Center collapse may have substantially
increased the risk that tens of thousands of people who lived, worked, or visited
Lower Manhattan may now contract future illnesses. These forgotten victims may not
realize the full extent oftheir injuries for months or years to come; when they do, they
will likely turn to the courts to seek compensation for their injuries. Because the toxic
fallout from the World Trade Center may have affected tens of thousands of people,
the ensuing mass-tort 3 litigation willpresent difficulties thatthe currentjudicial system

* J.D. Candidate, 2002, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.A., 1999,
Northwestern University. I would like to thank Professors John Applegate and Gene Shreve
for their helpful comments and suggestions during my work on this Note. I would also like to
thank my parents, Ken and Rita, for their unwavering love and support. I would like to extend
a special thank you to Mindy Finnigan, Ben Brimeyer, and Tom Goodwin, who collectively
taught me the true meaning of patience. I dedicate this Note to the innocent victims who
tragically lost their lives on September 11, 2001-we will never forget.
I. Anonymous PublicComment(Nov. 8, 2001) (Submitted in Response to the Department
ofJustice's Nov. 5,200 1, Notice oflnquiry and Advance Notice of Rulemaking Regarding the
September - 11 Victim Compensation Fund of 2001), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/WO00248.html.
2. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42; 115 Stat.
230 (2001).
3. There are two types of mass-tort litigation: the single disaster case and the multiexposure case:
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is not equipped to handle.
As a general rule, mass-tort litigation, imposes unique burdens on the judicial
system, many of which stem from the complicated analysis that judges must make to
determine which forum's4 substantive tort law will govern the various claims.5 Current
Supreme Court case law makes this analysis, often referred to as a court's choice-oflaw inquiry,' needlessly complex, thereby creating inefficient and inequitable
outcomes.7 Scholars and judges haye responded to this problem by suggesting that the
federal government intervene by creating a body of substantive tort law to simplify
mass-tort litigation! Unfortunately, however, many scholars have lamented that
enactment of substantive mass-tort law-for example, enactment of products liability
standards for asbestos litigation-has generally been politically unrealistic.9
Regardless, the need for federal intervention is no more apparent than in the mass
toxic-tort litigation that will inevitably ensue from the environmental fallout from the
collapse of the World Trade Center. Indeed, given the dangerous environmental
situation that existed in Lower Manhattan, tens of thousands ofpeople may now risk

In the single-disaster case, a large number of persons residing in different
states are killed or injured in a single disaster, such as an airplane crash. [In
the case of an airline crash, typically] the victims or their beneficiaries will
bring a negligence claim against the airline and a products liability claim
against the manufacturer of the airplane and sometimes against the
manufacturer of the component part as well .... The multi-exposure case
involves claims of a large number of persons exposed to a product that has
caused an illness or condition, such as asbestos, Agent Orange, Dalkon Shield,
and DES litigation. The problems in these cases are complicated by the fact
that a number of different manufacturers may have manufactured the product
so that it is not always possible to identify the individual manufacturer whose
product caused the injury to the particular victim. The problems are further
complicated because the injuries may not appear for a number of years ....
Robert A.Sedler, The Complex LitigationProject'sProposalforFederally-MandatedChoice
ofLaw in Mass Torts Cases:AnotherAssault on State Sovereignty, 54 LA. L. REv. 1085, 1085
n.1 (1994).
Both types of mass-tort litigation produce the complex choice-of-law problems that are
addressed in this Note. Although the unique characteristics ofthe particular mass-tort litigation
will produce variances in the nature and degree ofthe specific choice-of-law problems plaguing
the litigation, the fundamental issues and dilemmas are the same. As a result, this Note builds
on literature that has discussed either type of mass-tort litigation.
4. "Forum" usually means a particular state, although in international contexts, it can
mean a particular country.
5. See, e.g., Barbara Ann Atwood, The Choice-of-Law Dilemmain Mass TortLitigation:
Kicking Around Erie, Klaxon, and Van Dusen, 19 CONN. L. REv. 9, 18 (1986).
6. The term "choice of law" is often used interchangeablywith the term"conflict of laws."
Therefore, I use both of these terms throughout this Note.
7. See, e.g., Atwood, supra note 5, at 18.
8. See, e.g., Michael H. Gottesman, Drainingthe Dismal Swamp: The Casefor Federal
Choice ofLaw Statutes, 80 GEo. L.J. 1, 2-3 (1991).
9. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, FederalizingChoice ofLawfor Mass-TortLitigation, 70
TEx. L. REv. 1623, 1631-32 (1992).
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developing illnesses from exposure to toxic substances, including asbestos.'0 The
current judicial system is ill-equipped to manage the enormity of this eventual
litigation and the staggeringly complex choice-of-law problems that will result.
Although recent legislation will somewhat reduce the burden of the "choice-of-law
problem" that will plague this litigation, choice-of-law issues will still threaten to
make the future litigation unmanageable, inefficient, and unfair." Congress should
solve this problem by enacting a uniformbody of federal substantive tort law that will
cover the issues likely to arise in September-11-based toxic-tort 2 litigation (for
example, applicable standards ofconduct and issues of liability, proof, and causation).
Arguably, congressional enactment of substantive mass-tort law is no longer
politically unrealistic. In light ofpost-September 11 political realities and Congress's
recent willingness to enact incremental tort reform laws, incremental substantive masstort legislation is a viable and necessary solution.
After introducing the concept of choice of law in Part LA, this Note describes in
Part I.B the unique problems afflicting mass-tort litigation due to choice-of-law issues.
Part ILA chronicles the environmental dangers that existed in Lower Manhattan on
and after September 11, and Part H.B explains the choice-of-law issues that will
plague the mass toxic-tort litigation that will inevitably ensue. Then, Part Il.A
discusses one proposed solution to the choice-of-lawproblemin mass torts: enactment
of federal substantive tort law. Finally, inPart IH.B this Note concludes that the nature
of future September-1 1-based mass-tort litigationjustifies and requires congressional
enactment of substantive tort law to manage this litigation.
I. THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROBLEM INMASS TORTS
When a lawsuit has factual connections to multiple states or to a foreign nation, a
state court will use the choice-of-law doctrine of the state in which it sits to determine
which state's substantive law will govern the case. 3 Federal district courts sitting in
diversity, 4 which are the courts that handle the vast majority ofmass-tort litigation,"
must also conduct a choice-of-law analysis to determine the governing substantive
law.'6 In mass-tort litigation, a federal court's choice-of-law analysis can be
extraordinarily time consuming and complex because of the burdens that current law
places on federal courts.'" These burdens often make the litigation's proceedings

10. See infra Part II.A.
I1.
See infraPart H.B.
12. Black's Law Dictionary defines "toxic tort" quite simply as "[a] civil wrong arising
from exposure to a toxic substance ..... BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1497 (7th ed. 1999).
13. LEE S. KREINDLER ET AL., NEW YORK LAW OF TORTS § 18.32 (West N.Y. Practice
SeriesNo. 16, 1997).
14. Federal courts have diversity jurisdiction over all civil actions between citizens of
different states when "the matter in controversy" is more than $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)

(2000).
15. Linda S. Mullenix, Mass Tort Litigation and the Dilemma ofFederalization,44
DEPAUL L. REV.755, 786 (1995).
16. See infra Part I.B.1.
17. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Class Resolution of the Mass-Tort Case: A Proposed
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exceedingly inefficient because the federal judge must. expend substantial time and
energy to resolve choice-of-law issues. 8 In addition, these burdens often lead to
inequitable results because the current law tends to produce duplicative litigation that
increases the risk that plaintiffs with substantially similar claims will experience
disparate legal outcomes. 9
This Part begins by establishing why choice-of-law doctrines are a necessary and
important component ofAmerican law. Then, this Part discusses the particular issues
and problems that choice of law presents in the context of mass-tort litigation.
A. The Needfor Choice-of-Law Doctrine Generally
In any given lawsuit, the relevant legal dispute will have numerous factual
elements, or contacts, that have connections to various geographic locations. In a tort
case, for example, these contacts might include the place of injury, the place of the
tortious conduct,20 the parties' domicile,2 place of the parties' incorporation, or the
parties' principal place ofbusiness.' If all of the tort lawsuit's contacts arose from the
same state, then the case would implicate only that state's law.' In such a case,
personal jurisdiction requirements would likely permit the plaintiff to maintain the
lawsuit only in a court of that state.24 In the end, the state court would apply its own

FederalProcedureAct, 64 TEX. L.'REV. 1039, 1076 (1986).
18.Id.
19. See, e.g., Alvin B. Rubin, Mass Torts and LitigationDisasters,20 GA. L. REv. 429,

436 (1986).
20. In a relatively simple tort case, such as one involving an automobile accident caused
by a driver's negligence, the place of injury will be in the same state as the place of the tort. In
some tort cases, however, the injury and the tort will occur in different states because a
tortfeasor's conduct in one state can cause injuries to parties in other states. This divergence
often occurs in tort cases involving products liability claims or claims against airlines. See, e.g.,
KRIENDLER ET AL, supra note 13, § 18.37 (discussing the relevance of this divergence under
New York choice-of-law rules). Because September-I I-based torts will likely involve claims
against airlines and products manufacturers, it is likely that for many claims, the tort and the
resulting injury will have occurred in different states.
21. Although the terms "residence" and "domicile" are often used interchangeably by
courts, legislatures, and commentators, EUGENE F. ScOLES ET AL,CONFCT OF LAWS § 4.13,

at 240-41 (3d ed. 2000), this Note uses the terms "domicile" and "domiciliary" because New
York courts, recognizing a distinction between "residence" and "domicile," use the concept of
"domicile" for purposes of choice-of-law analysis. Antone v. Gen. Motors Corp., 473 N.E.2d
742, 745-46 (N.Y. 1984). Under New York law, domicile "requires a physical presence in the
State and an intention to make the State a permanent home." Id. at 745.
22. SCOLES ET AL, supra note 21, § 1.l, at 1.
23. See id.
24. Personal jurisdiction is a court's power and authority to bring a person into its
adjudicative process and make a decision that binds the parties as to any matter that is properly
brought before it. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 856-57 (7th ed. 1999). The Supreme Court has
interpreted the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to require that a defendant
have certain minimum contacts with the state before the state's courts may exercise personal

2002]

SEPTEMBER -1 ]-BASED TOXIC TORTS

state's substantive tort law to determine the rights and liabilities of the parties. In this
simple scenario, no choice-of-law issue would exist.
However, if all of the tort lawsuit's contacts did not arise from the same state, then
the case would potentially implicate the laws of more than one state.' For example,
if the parties hailed from different states or ifthe plaintiffhad been injured outside her
home state, then the source of applicable substantive tort law might be unclear.26 The
facts of one famous case, Neumeier v. Kuehner,2" illustrate this point. Kuehner, aNew
York domiciliary, drove his car across the border from New York to Ontario to pick
up Neuneier, an Ontario domiciliary.' While driving in Ontario, Kuehner and his
passengerNeumeier were killed when a train struck their car.29 Under an Ontario guest
statute, Kuehner's estate would be liable for Neumeier's wrongful death only upon
proof of Kuehner's gross negligence." Under New York law, however, Kuehner's
estate would be liable upon proof of ordinary negligence." In this case, because the
plaintiff and defendant were domiciled in Ontario and New York, respectively, 2 the
lawsuit implicated the laws of both forums, thereby leaving the source of applicable
law uncertain. In addition, because Ontario and New York imposed different
standards of care in the driver/passenger relationship,33 the decision regarding
applicable tort law had material ramifications. Indeed, the outcome of the case likely
hinged on the question of applicable law. In cases like this, a critical choice-of-law
issue exists.

jurisdiction over the defendant. GENE R. SHREVE & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, UNDERSTANDING
CIVIL PROCEDURE 24-25 (2d ed. 1994). Federal courts sitting in diversity are indirectly subject
to the same limitations. Id. at 26 (noting that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 requires that
federal courts may only exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant "who could be
subjected to thejurisdiction of a court... in the state in which the [federal] court is located").
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant in one of four ways: 1) if the
defendant is domiciled in the state (or, if the defendant is a corporation, if the corporation is
incorporated or has its principal place of operations there); 2) if the defendant consents to
personal jurisdiction; 3) if the defendant can be found and served within the state; or, if these
three situations do not apply, 4) if the defendant has "certain minimum contacts" with the state
"such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice."' Id. at 30-37, 71 (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316
.(1945)).

In practice, therefore, the number of states in which a plaintiff can maintain a lawsuit might
be limited by personal jurisdiction requirements. This Note will assume, however, that the
particular court may constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
25. SHREVE & RAVEN-HANSEN, supranote 24, at 174.
26. Id.
27.286 N.E.2d 454 (N.Y. 1972).

28. Id. at 455.
29. Id.
30. Id.
3 1.1d-at 458.
32. The plaintiff and defendant in this case were the widows of Neumeier and Kuehner,

respectively. Id. at 454-55.
33. Id. at 455, 458.
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When, as inNeumeier,a court reasonably has more than one state's law from which
to choose the applicable substantive law, a court resolves the problem by turning to
the common-law-based' choice-of-law doctrine of the state in which the court sits.35
Choice-of-law doctrine is the body of jurisprudence that helps courts to determine
which state's law should govern a dispute having contacts with two or more states, the
substantive laws of which conflict.' Each state's choice-of-law doctrine consists of
a set of rules" or a method of analysis39 that guides the court to the substantive law
that should govern the case. When a plaintiff files a suit in a particular state's court,
the court will apply its own state's choice-of-law principles to determine the

34. With only one exception, Louisiana, state legislatures have declined to codify choiceof-law rules. See Symeon C. Symeonides, TheALl's Complex LitigationProject:Commencing
the NationalDebate, 54 LA. L. REV. 843, 845 (1994).
35. KREINDLERETAL, supra note 13, § 18.32. "A forum court... applies its own choice
of law rules to substantive law issues in a litigation which involves multi-state contacts." Id.
(emphasis added). When dealing with issues ofprocedurallaw, the court will always apply its
own state's law. Id. Unfortunately, the border between substance and procedure is notoriously
blurry and therefore subject to judicial manipulation. See ScOLEs ET AL,supra note 21, § 3.83.12, at 124-34. Nevertheless, New York courts have offered the following general distinction:
procedural law concerns the mechanics of bringing a lawsuit, while substantive law places an
impediment on a right orremedy. Barnett v. Johnson, 839 F. Supp. 236,242 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
36. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 295 (7th ed. 1999). Note that the determination of
governing state law is an academic exercise when the substantive laws of the involved states
do not actually differ with respect to the legal issue in question. This situation is known as a
"false conflict." Id.
37. For example, a number of states espouse "hard-and-fast" choice-of-law rules that
direct courts to apply the law of the state in which a particular event took place. See GENE R.
SHREVE,A CONFLCT-OF-LAws ANTHOLOGY 38-39,215-24 (1997). These relatively strict rules
are predominantly based on the American Law Institute's original Restatement of the Law of
Conflict of Laws. Id. at 38-39. For tort causes of action, for example, the relevant rule states
that "[t]he law of the place of the wrong determines whether a person has sustained a legal
injury." RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378 (1934).
38. On the other hand, the vast majority of states adhere to any one of a number of
methodologies that attempt to weigh a variety of factors to determine which state's law will
govern the controversy. See SHREVE, supra note 37, at 215-24. Currently, the dominant
methodology is that of the American Law Institute's Second Restatement of the Law of
Conflict of Laws. Id. Among the factors that these kinds of approaches consider are the
domiciles of the parties, the states in which the injury and conduct occurred, and the relative
strength of each state's interest in having its law applied. See id. As discussed in Part lI.B,
infra, New York espouses a "government interest analysis" methodology that seeks to
determine "which of two [or more] competingjurisdictions has the greate[st] interest in having
its law applied in the litigation. The greate[st] interest is determined by an evaluation of the
'facts or contacts which ... relate to the purpose of the particular law in conflict."' Padula v.
Lilard Properties Corp., 644 N.E.2d 1001, 1002 (N.Y. 1994) (quoting Schultz v. Boy Scouts
of America, Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679, 684 (N.Y. 1985)). For an extended discussion of the New
York choice-of-law approach, see infra Part II.B.
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applicable state law. 9 Because each state has its own choice-of-law doctrine, the same
set of facts can produce a different legal outcome depending on the state's particular
choice-of-law principles and, by extension, on the state in which the plaintiff filed the
suit. A hypothetical scenario based on the Neumeier facts provides such an example.
Assume that Ontario choice-of-law doctrine dictates that in tort cases with
multistate contacts, the law of the place of injury will govern the case.' Further
assume that New York choice-of-law doctrine dictates that New York law should
always apply absent a contrary directive from the legislature or settled judicial
precedent (assume that none exists).4' IfNeumeier's widow filed her wrongful death
action in aNew York court, the court would employ NewYork choice-of-law doctrine
and apply New York law, which permits recovery upon proof of ordinary
negligence.42 However, if she filed in an Ontario court, the court would employ
Ontario choice-of-law doctrine and apply Ontario law, which only permits recovery
upon proof of gross negligence.43 In this example, because Ontario and New York
employ dissimilar methods to resolve the same choice-of-law issue, a different burden
of proof would govern Mrs. Neumeier's case depending on whether she filed it in
Ontario or New York. If Mrs. Neumeier researched the choice-of-law doctrines of
Ontario and New York, she could likely anticipate how each court would resolve the
choice-of-law issue and thereby predict which substantive law would govern the case.
Indeed, in a case like Neumeier that potentially implicates the laws of more than
one state, a plaintiff can often file suit, subject to personal jurisdiction limitations, in
more than one jurisdiction." As a result, by selecting the jurisdiction in which to file
the suit, the plaintiff effectively has the power to select the choice-of-law principles
that the court will use to determine the applicable substantive law."' From there, it is
up to the court to interpret, in light of the facts of the case, its state's choice-of-law
rules to determine which state's substantive law will actually govern the case. 6

39. KREINDLER ET AL., supranote 13, § 18.32; see also Gottesman, supra note 8, at 3.
40. This "hard-and-fast" rule, which is still used in eleven states, see ScOLES ETAL, supra
note 21, §2.16, at 68-74, is known as the lex loci delicti rule, which literally translates as "the
law of the place of the wrong," see id. § 17.2-17.7, at 688-97.
41. This rule is known as the lexfori approach, which literally translates as "the law of the
forum." See id. § 2.10, at 38-43. In reality, no state currently espouses this approach. Id.
42. Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454,458 (N.Y. 1972).
43. Id. at 455. Note that, depending on the facts of the case and the state's choice-of-law
doctrine, a state court may be directed to apply anotherstate's law to the controversy. In other
words, state courts do not invariably apply their own state's substantive law to each and every
case. Indeed, the ultimate outcome of Neumeier demonstrates this. In Neumeier,the New York
court applied Ontario law after engaging in an analysis ofthe governmental interests ofOntario
and New York. Id. at 456-59.
44. See supranote 24 and accompanying text.
45. The power of the plaintiff to choose the jurisdiction in which to file the lawsuit can
lead to the phenomenon known as "forum shopping," aprocess by which a plaintiff searches
for the forum that will apply the substantive law most favorable to her position. See infra notes
91-94 and accompanying text.
46. Essentially, determination of the applicable substantive law is a two-step process.
First, the plaintiffchooses the state in which to file the suit, thereby establishing the choice-of-
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Because many lawsuits have connections with more than one state, it is crucial that a
court turn to its state's choice-of-law doctrine to resolve the issue by employing a set
of rules or a method of analysis rather than by leaving the decision up to the personal
feelings of the parties or the judge.47 The importance of choice-of-law doctrine is no
more obvious than in mass-tort litigation.
B. Choice-of-Law Issues in Mass-Tort Litigation
Because federal diversity-jurisdiction courts manage the bulk of mass-tort
litigation, understanding the choice-of-law process in these courts is crucial. From
there, the problems that federal courts face in solving choice-of-law issues can be
understood.
1. Choice of Law in Federal Diversity Courts
Since the late 1970s, federal courts have been.the "forums of choice for mass tort
litigants."'1 8 Although Congress has demonstrated over the last decade an increased
willingness to federalize various aspects of tort law,49 the vast majority of tort law still
derives from state law.' As a result, mass-tort litigation in federal courts will almost
invariablybe based on diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction.5' When sitting in diversity,
the Eriedoctrine requires federal courts to apply to the controversy the law ofthe state
in which the federal court sits.52 In addition, Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric
Manufacturing 3 requires federal diversity courts to apply the choice-of-law rules of

law principle that the court will use to determine which state's law will govern. Second, the
court selects the governing law based on the preselected choice-of-law principle and the facts
of the particular case.
47. Unfortunately, choice-of-law analyses are notoriously prone to results-oriented
manipulation by the courts. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Class Actions and Jurisdictional
Boundaries:Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547, 552-60 (1996).
48. Mullenix, supranote 15, at 786 ("[Mass tort] litigants have voted with their feet and
marched overwhelmingly into federal court."); see also Atwood, supra note 5, at 9.
49. See infra notes 356-60 and accompanying text.
50. See Atwoodsupra note 5, at 15. Congress has historically shown deference to states'
substantive tort law by opting to "intrude] on state substantive tort law as little as possible."
Thomas M. Reavley & Jerome W. Wesevich, An Old Rule for New Reasons: PlaceofInjury
as a FederalSolution to Choice ofLaw in Single-Accident Mass-Tort Cases,71 TEX. L. REV.
1, 21, 35 (1992). For example, even in legislation such as the Federal Tort Claims Act,
Congress has chosen to defer to state tort law for determination of party rights and standards
of conduct. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(c), 2671-80 (1994) (subjecting the federal government to
liability for the tortious acts of its agents under the law ofthe statein which the act occurred).
As a result, tort claims--including toxic-tort claims--will almost exclusively be based on state
law, regardless of whether the claim is brought in state or federal court.
51. Atwood, supranote 5, at 11 n.3; see also supra note 14.
52. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see also SHREE & RAVEN-HANSEN,
supra note 24, at 157-59.
53. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
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the state in which the court sits.54 If a case is transferred to55 or consolidated in 6 a
federal diversity court, Van Dusen v. Barrack" requires the court to apply the state
law that would have been applied had there been no change of venue."
Unfortunately, these rules oflawhinder a federal court's ability to manage complex
litigation effectively. Indeed, if the federal litigation arose from controversies in a
number of different states, then the federal court handling the multijurisdiction
litigation must identify and apply the distinct choice-of-law rules ofnumerous states.59
Ultimately, the court will often need to apply a variety of different substantive laws
to otherwise similarly situated parties merely because they do not share the same
domicile.' As Professor Atwood states, "[t]he multi-layered process of identifying a
state's choice-of-law methodology, applying it to given facts, and then ascertaining
the applicable substantive law can be difficult even in a single-claimant case."'" In
complex litigation, a court's task becomes even more daunting because of the
manageability problems involved in identifying and applying the laws of numerous
states.62 Adherence to the rules of Erie, Klaxon, and Van Dusen forces federal
diversity courts handling complex litigation to engage in "labyrinthian choice-of-law
analyses"'63 that "impede[' federal judges in their efforts to manage complex multiparty cases"" and "push an already cumbersome action toward procedural
unmanageability.""5
In the class action context, the Supreme Court compounded the problem further in
PhillipsPetroleumCo. v. Shutts.' In Shutts, the Court held that a state court may not
constitutionally apply its own state's law to nonresident plaintiff class members who
do not have "significant" choice-of-law contacts with the state.67 As a result, a court
presiding over a class action must confirm that each member ofthe classhas sufficient
contacts with the court's state before it may constitutionally apply the state's law to

54. Id. at 496; see also SHiREVE & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 24, at 174-77.
55. Under the federal change-of-venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1994), a federal court
may transfer a case to another district in which the case might have been brought "[flor the
convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest ofjustice." Id.
56. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1407, civil actions involving common questions of fact "may be
transferred to any district for.., consolidated pretrial proceedings." 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1994).
57. 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
58. Id. at 639.
59. Paul S. Bird, Mass Tort Litigation: A Statutory Solution to the Choice of Law
Impasse, 96 YALE L.J. 1077, 1078 (1987).
60. Id. Professor Atwood comments, "federal judges overseeing mass tort lawsuits have
... to apply the often ambiguous law of distant states to both choice of law and substantive
questions." Atwood, supra note 5, at 11.
61. Atwood, supra note 5, at I I n.7.
.62. Id.
63:Id. at 11-12.
64. Id. at 12.
65.Id. at 11.
66. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
67. Id.at 821-22; see also WilliamD. Torchiana, Choice ofLaw andthe MultistateClass:
Forum Interests in MattersDistant, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 913, 913 (1986).
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the entire class.6 Prior to Shutts, courts handling mass-tort class actions often tried to
relieve the burden created by Erie, Klaxon, and Van Dusen by applying the
substantive law of a single state to the entire controversy.' After Shutts, however,
these courts are now unable to fashion "innovative state law solutions to procedural
manageability and choice-of-law problems."70 In a case involving a geographically
diverse class ofplaintiffs, courts may not "cavalierly apply a single law to a case" but
rather must potentially apply the substantive laws of numerous states.7'
2. Problems Inherent in Choice of Law in Federal Courts '
Scholars have strongly criticized the current choice-of-law systembecause itplaces
a heavy burden on federal diversity courts in mass-tort litigation. 3 By creating "severe
'
practical problems,"74
the current choice-of-law regime "derails" the efficiency and

68. See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 821-22.
69. See Atwood, supra note 5, at 12.
70. Id.
71. Torchiana, supranote 67, at 915 (quoting Steven Greenhouse, ClassActions: A Key
Ruling,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1985, at D2).
72. Choice-of-law problems are not the only difficulties that plague mass-tort litigation.
Indeed, Kastenmeier and Geyh identified numerous failures in mass-tort litigation procedural
mechanisms. Robert W. Kastenmeier &Charles G. Geyh, The Casein SupportofLegislation
Facilitatingthe ConsolidationofMass-Accident Litigation:A Viewfrom the Legislature, 73
MARQ. L. REV. 535, 538-43 (1990). More recently, a 1999 report to Chief Justice Rehnquist
listed twenty-three "phenomena"-only one of which was choice-of-law----"that have been
viewed as problems by a significant number of experienced mass tort participants and
observers." REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES AND THE WORKING GROUP ON
MASS TORTS TO THE CHIEFJUSTICE OFTHE UNITED STATES AND TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OFTHE UNITED STATES, REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION, reprintedin 187 F.R.D. 293,30715 (1999) [hereinafter REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION]. However, a discussion of these
other problems is beyond the scope of this paper.

73. See Atwood, supra note 5, at 18 (noting that the present law imposes "immense
practical difficulties... in such multidistrict cases"); see also Friedrich K. Juenger, Mass

Disastersandthe Conflict ofLaws, 1989 U. ILL L. REV. 105, 108-10; Kastenmeier & Geyh,
supra note 72, at 549 (noting that one federal judge observed that mass tort litigation "pose[s]
enormous difficulties for our judicial system").
Professor Atwood offered a colorful description of the problem: "The process of
determining applicable law under the doctrines of Klaxon and Van Dusen has been
characterized as an entry into 'the wilderness in which courts sometimes find themselves when
searching for solutions to problems arising under the judicial nightmare known as Conflict of
Laws."' Atwood, supra note 5, at 27 (quoting Forsyth v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 520 F.2d 608,
609 (9th Cir. 1975)).
74. Kastenmeier & Geyh, supra note 72, at 541 (quoting Multiparty. Multiforum
JurisdictionAct: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the
Administration ofJusticeof the House Committee on the Judiciary,101st Cong., Ist Sess. 42
(1989) (Feb. 14, 1990 letter from Bruce Navarro, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to Robert
W. Kastenmeier)).
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equity advantages that the collective adjudication ofmass torts should ideally offer."'
i. Efficiency
Critics hve suggested that the present system is inefficient for two reasons: the
resolution of choice-of-law issues is a lengthy and expensive process, 6 and the current
system produces wastefully duplicative adjudication of claims.' First, choice-of-law
issues "increase the complexity, expense, and duration of mass-tort litigation.""8 At
the outset of the litigation, for example, courts must apply "substantial judicial
resources" to determine which substantive law will govern the lawsuit.7 9 As discussed
above, a federal court handling complex tort litigation "must apply the choice-of-law
rules of the state in which each plaintifforiginally filed suit to every choice of law
issue that arises involving that plaintiff."sO Put simply, "[t]his is an extraordinarily
arduous task"' Because a significant portion of a court's time and energy must be
used to sort out the morass of choice-of-law issues involved in mass-tort litigation, a
court's time-and the attorneys' time, for that matter-is diverted from considering
the case on its merits,' thereby delaying the litigation 3 and making it more
expensive." In the "most egregious" cases, federal courts may have to wait years

75. Bird, supra note 59, at 1085-86.
76. Mullenix, supra note 17, at 1076.
77. See Bird, supra note 59, at 1085; see also Mary Kay Kane, DraftingChoice ofLaw
Rulesfor Complex Litigation: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 10 REv. LITIG. 309, 310 (1991).
78. Mullenix, supra note 17, at 1076.
79. Id. at 1076; see also Atwood, supra note 5, at 27-29; Arthur R. Miller & David
Crump, Jurisdictionand Choice ofLaw in Multistate ClassActions After Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Shutts, 96 YALE L.J. 1, 63-67 (1986) (discussing the difficulty in managing choice-oflaw issues in widely dispersed mass tort litigation).
80. Reavley & Wesevich, supra note 50, at 4 (emphasis added); see also supranotes 4858 and accompanying text.
81. Reavley & Wesevich, supra note 50, at4.
82. In the actual opinion of a mass-tort case, one federal judge urged Congress to help
solve the problem because "[u]ncertainty on the choice oflaw question requires a considerable
expenditure of time, money and other resources." Ford v. Continental Airlines Corp., 720 F.
Supp. 1445, 1455 (D. Colo. 1988).
83. Judge Alvin Rubin noted that "despite able judicial management," seven hundred
asbestos cases were pending in the Eastern District of Texas in 1986; these cases rarely settled
or went to trial in fewer than two years. Rubin, supra note 19, at 434. More recently, mass-tort
suits filed shortly after the 1993 World Trade Center bombing "have yet to go to trial." Michael
Freedman, Waiting in the Wings, FORBES, Oct. 29, 2001, at 62.
84. In one somewhat dated study, the Rand Institute determined that "[a]sbestos litigation
has resulted in far more expense than in recovery of damages for injured persons." Rubin,
supra note 19, at 430 (citing JOHN KAKALuK ET AL, VARIATION IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION
COMPENSATION AND EXPENSES xviii-xix (1984)). The Institute estimated that "injured persons
receive less than thirty-seven percent of the total amount spent on litigation" and that "[a]lmost
two-thirds of the total expenditures are for attorneys' fees and other litigation expenses." Id.
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while questions certified to state courts are resolved. 5 Even if the case never reaches
the merits at trial, the uncertainty stemming from the choice-of-law questions can
thwart the settlement process. 6 Indeed, delays in determining governing law can
wreak havoc on settlement negotiations as parties struggle to assess the strength of
their positions in light of this legal ambiguity."
Second, the current system is inefficient because it tends to produce separate,
duplicative adjudication of similar claims;" Ideally, an efficient system would
facilitate the collective adjudication of mass-tort claims so as to minimize courts' use
of resources and avoid concurrent or sequential resolutions of individual claims that
are based on the same factual dispute. 9 However the current system often undermines
these efficiency gains ° by producing duplicative litigation 9' in a variety of ways.
For example, because a federal court must apply the choice-of-law rules ofthe state
in which they sit,' plaintiffs have the incentive to "forum shop" to find the law that
is most favorable to their position." Each plaintiff, by taking into account the facts of
her case and the choice-of-law rules of the various states in which she can file and
permissibly maintain her suit, will individually determine which state's choice-of-law
rule will lead to application of the substantive law most favorable to her position.
Because plaintiffs in mass-tort litigation will have different contacts with different
states, these plaintiffs will likely file lawsuits in numerous states even though the
plaintiffs' claims are based on the same mass tort. This leads to wasteful, duplicative
litigation of common issues of law.94 Even if the dispersed lawsuits were consolidated

85. Mullenix, supra note 17, at 1076. Professor Mullenix opines that "[i]ronically, the
Eriedoctrine has engendered an evil in the mass-tort context that the decision [of Erie] itself
was intended to eliminate. The Erie doctrine has repeatedly proven to be a major impediment
to the fair adjudication of mass-tort claims. .. ." Id.
86. Kastenmeier & Geyh, supra note 12, at 557; see also Mullenix, supra note 17, at
1076. For example, defendants are sometimes "pressed to settle even relatively weak claims
rather than face the enormous risks posed by the aggregation of numerous claims" and the
uncertain resolution of choice-of-law issues. REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION, supranote
72, at 298.
87. Mullenix, supra note 17, at 1076.
88. See Bird, supra note 59, at 1085; see also Kane, supra note 77, at 310.
89. Bird, supra note 59, at 1084-85.
90. As Bird noted, "pre-trial choice of law rulings quickly dissipate the efficiency gains
collective adjudication is intended to achieve." Id. at 1086.
91. The evils of duplicative litigation are apparent: "Repeated relitigation of the common
issues in a complex case unduly expends the resources of attorney and client, [and] burdens
already overcrowded dockets ....
" CoMPLEX LITIGATION PROjECT 9 (Proposed Final Draft

1993) (estimating the enormity of the costs of duplicative lawsuits in complex litigation).
92. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
93. See Gottesman, supra note 8, at 31-32; see also Reavley & Wesevich, supra note 50,
at 3-4. As one scholar noted, "reliance on state choice of law rules, which vary considerably
among states, has produced an enormous incentive to forum shop among federal courts in
different states, and this has contributed to the dispersion of essentially similar litigation in
multiple courts." Kane, supranote 77, at 313.
94. See Kane, supra note 77, at 313.
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in a single federal district, the district court, under Van Dusen, would still have to
expend significant resources applying the choice-of-law rles of the states from which
the cases were transferred.95
In addition, because choice-of-law problems tend to frustrate the procedural
mechanisms that enable courts to adjudicate mass-tort lawsuits collectively, the
current system fosters duplicative litigation. Van Dusen's holding produces "two
serious barriers to effective consolidation" of mass-tort lawsuits.' "The first stems
simply from the fact that the chaotic state of the choice of law field requires the
federal courts to engage in an extremely complicated inquiry in order to ascertain the
various state choice of law rules that might be applied."' The second arises if the
court concludes, after its choice-of-law analysis, that it must apply multiple state laws
to the underlying claims of the collective proceeding.98 If the mass-tort litigation
consists of hundreds or thousands of individual claims that must be resolved under
varying state laws, the consolidated proceeding will become unmanageable and may
have to be broken up. 9
In the realm of class actions, choice-of-law issues may prevent the mass-tort action
from going forward, " or may even prevent a federal judge from certifying the class
altogether.'' This is because the rule governing class actions, Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23, states that a class action can only be maintained if 1) questions of law
or fact are common to the class,"° 2) these common questions of law or fact
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the class, 0 3 and
3) the class action is manageable."' 4
In attempting to meet these class action requirements, a court has the incentive to
try to apply its own state's law to the claims of all of the class members.0 This
technique would eliminate not only the need to make complex choice-of-law inquiries,

95. See supra text accompanying notes 55-65.
96. Kane, supra note 77, at 313-14.
97. Id. at 313. Professor Kane provides an example from the realm of mass toxic torts:
[l]n the litigation following the plant disaster in Bhopal, India, suits originally
filed in federal courts in California, Connecticut, the District of Columbia,
Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia were transferred to the Southern District
of New York. After examining each of those state's conflicts laws, the
[Southern District] determined that choice of law questions would be resolved
under three different approaches .... The court then analyzed the issues posed
under each of these approaches, ultimately concluding that all the states would
apply Indian law.
Id. at 313-14.
,98. Id. at 314.
99.Id.
l00.,See Torchiana, supra note 67, at 915.
101. Id. at 925-36.
102.,FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
103. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
104. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D).
105. Torchiana, supranote 67, at 915.
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but also the need to apply numerous states' substantive laws to the class action."0 6
However, the Court's holding inShuttswill often prevent a court from constitutionally
doing so.10 7 In many cases, Shutts will effectively destroy the viability of the class
action device in mass-tort litigation by requiring a federal court overseeing a class
action to "embark on a complex choice-of-law analysis."' 6 For example, because the
choice-of-law analysis in a class action is itselfa logistically daunting task, 9 the class
action may become unmanageable at the outset and thereby fail Rule 23's
requirements."' Additionally, if the court's choice-of-law analysis directs it to apply
the substantive law of numerous states, then the requirements of commonality and
predominance will likely not be met."'
If issues of fact are not common to the class, and the forum must apply
multiple laws [as a result of its choice-of-law analysis], then neither questions
of fact nor questions of law will be common to the class and the action will not
satisfy even the threshold commonality requirement. If questions of fact are
common, but multiple questions of law exist, then the common questions of
fact will not "predominate" over the individual
questions of law, and the
2
action will fail the predominance test."
In these situations, federal courts will often be forced to deny class certification and
dismiss the action,' 13to divide the class into subclasses, or to dismiss the claims of the
plaintiffs who destroy commonality and predominance. "" Regardless, of the court's
action, choice-of-lawproblems impede effective collective litigation of similar claims,
thereby producing wasteful and duplicative litigation.
Although the vast majority of commentators agree that the present system is

106. Id.
107. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
108. Torchiana, supra note 67, at 919. As Torchiana explains:
First, [the court] must decide, based on the choice-of-law rules of the forum,
what law will apply to plaintiffs not covered by forum law. The court must
then examine the foreign law or laws so selected and compare them to the laws
of the forum. Ifthe foreign law is the same as the law of the forum there is no
conflict... In the case of a "true" conflict, in which forum and foreign law
actually differ, the court must apply foreign law to the plaintiffclass members'
claims.
Id. at 919-20.
109. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
110. FED. R. Cirv. P. 23(b)(3)(D) (requiring class actions to be manageable).
11. Torchiana, supra note 67, at 926. "Specifically, questions of law will not be
'common' to a class and common questions will not 'predominate,' and after Shults a court
may not satisfy these requirements simply by deciding to apply forum law uniformly to all
claims." Id.
112. Id. at 926 (citing 3 H. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS §§ 4.25-.26 (2d ed.
1985)).
113. Id. at 929-30.
114. Id. at 932-36.
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inefficient," 5 a few scholars challenge this view." 6 This vocal minority argues that
choice-of-law issues in mass-tort litigation are not, from a practical standpoint, so
problematic as the majority suggests." 7 Criticizing the majority for treating the
efficiency problems as self-evident,"8 the minority scholars argue that the literature
fails to provide concrete evidence that the present system of mass-tort litigation
produces the efficiency problems to which the majority points." 9 The minority ignores
the cries of numerous federal judges 2 ---a group that regularly dealsfirst-handwith
mass-tort litigation and that is probably most familiar with the practical problems that
choice-of-law inquiries cause. Professors Robert Sedler and Aaron Twerski bluntly
state that "[i]n practice, choice of law issues in tort cases are not at all difficult to

115. See Atwood, supra note 5, at 27-29; see also Bird, supra note 59, at 1085; Kane,
supra note 77, at 310; Miller & Crump, supra note 79, at 63-67; Mullenix, supra note 17, at
1076.
116. See generally Kramer, supranote 47; Robert A. Sedler & Aaron D. Twerski, State
Choice ofLaw in Mass Tort Cases: A Response to "A View from the Legislature",73 MARQ.
L. REV.625 (1990) [hereinafter Sedler & Twerski, State Choice ofLaw]; Robert A. Sedler &
Aaron D. Twerski, The Case Against All Encompassing FederalMass Tort Legislation:
Sacrifice Without Gain,73 MARQ. L. REV. 76 (1989) [hereinafter Sedler &Twerski, Sacrifice
Without Gain].
117. According to Professors Sedler and Twerski, "only three mass tort cases have
presented serious management problems to the American court system: asbestos, Agent Orange
and Dalkon Shield." Sedler & Twerski, Sacrifice Without Gain,supra note 116, at 106.
118. Kramer, supra note 47, at 568; see also Sedler & Twerski, Sacrifice Without Gain,
supra note 116, at 91 (arguing that scholars "simply assumel that all of these alleged harmful
effects result from [choice-of-law difficulties]").
119. Sedler & Twerski, Sacrifice Without Gain, supra note 116, at 91.
120. Judge Finesilver has stated: "The choice of law problems inherent in [mass-torti
litigation cry out for federal statutory resolution. We urge Congress to [act]... in the context
of... mass torts ....Uncertainty on the choice of law question requires a considerable
expenditure of time, money and other resources .... ." Symeonides, supra note 34, at 854
(quoting Ford v. Continental Airlines Corp., 720 F. Supp. 1445, 1454-55 (D. Colo. 1988)).
Judge Rubin stated that "[t]he present system is slow, inefficient, costly, and potentially unjust
both to injured parties and defendants," Rubin, supranote 19, at 433, and suggested that "we
eliminate the roulette-wheel characteristics of our present mode of adjudication," id. at 450.
Judge Weinstein stated that "[p]roblems in efficiently resolving the total [mass-tort] dispute
in one court are created, unnecessarily, by our federalism.., and by the reluctance ofCongress
and the courts to recognize that a new world economic and technological order requires some
rethinking of our. .. choice-of-law shibboleths." Jack B. Weinstein, Mass Tort Jurisdiction
andChoice ofLaw in a MultinationalWorld Communicatingby ExtraterrestrialSatellites,37
WILLAMETE L. REV. 145, 146 (2001). Finally, Judge Hall stated that "[t]he law on 'choice of
law'... is a veritable jungle" that leads to "areign of chaos." Kastenmeier & Geyh, supranote
72, at 541 (alteration in original) (quoting In re Paris Air Crash, 399 F. Supp. 732, 739 (C.D.
Cal. 1975)). For continued rantings from both the bench and bar, see Multiparty,Muiforum
JurisdictionAct: HearingBefore the Subcommittee on Courts,IntellectualProperty,and the
Administration ofJusticeofthe House Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 42
(1989).
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resolve" and "are not at all complex."' In fact, one scholar even suggests that the
judges' complaints stem not from legitimate concerns about the state of the current
system, but rather fromthejudges' desire to avoid tediouswork.I Whilethe minority
rightly notes that most choice-of-law issues can be resolved before trial," they
nonetheless ignore not only the effect that choice-of-law uncertainty has on settlement
negotiations, 4 but also the obvious fact that the vast majority of cases never go to
trial."2 In addition, they argue that a federal judge's task is made easier by the fact that
most choice-of-law issues "tend to fall into certain fact-law patterns,"'2 6 but ignore the
fact that in order to be able to separate claims into these fact-law patterns, the judge
must still undergo a lengthy choice-of-law analysis to determine into which pattern
each claim falls.
The scholars who espouse the majority view have offered rebuttal to the minority
attacks. Congressman Robert Kastenmeier and Professor Charles Geyh challenge the
minority's assertion that only three mass-tort cases-asbestos, Agent Orange, and
Dalkon Shield litigation-have presented serious management problems. 2
Kastenmeier and Geyh correctly note that the current system's tendency to produce
duplicative adjudication increases courts' workload and creates inefficiency

121. Sedler & Twerski, State Choice ofLaw, supra note 116, at 632-33.
122. Kramer, supra note 47, at 582 n.130. Professor Kramer irreverently opines:
[The view amongjudges [seems to be that it is impossibly difficult to resolve
so many choice-of-law questions], though I suspect they may be influenced by
another factor: Doing multiple choice-of-law analyses in the same case is
boring and tedious, and a desire to avoid, this work (conscious -or not)
undoubtedly makes the arguments for applying a single law look more
attractive.... In any event, while experience grading exams gives me a certain
sympathy for the feeling, it is obviously inappropriate.
Id.
123. See, e.g., id. at 633.
124. Seesupranotes86-87 and accompanying text. Professors Sedler and Twerski naively
state that "once the choice of law decisions are made there will be no 'delay in settlements
resulting from uncertainty in the choice of law to be applied."' Sedler &Twerski, State Choice
ofLaw, supranote 116, at 634 (quoting Kastenmeier &Geyh, supranote 72, at 557). They fail
to recognize that in complex cases, sorting out choice-of-law issues is a time-consuming task
that can delay pretrial proceedings for months.
125. Indeed, the fact that a court is capable of resolving choice-of-law issues before trial
does nothing to negate the majority scholars' assertion thatpretrial resolution ofchoice-of-law
issues in mass-tort litigation increases the complexity, cost, and duration of the proceedings as
a whole. See supranotes 71-81 and accompanying text. Whether complex choice-of-law issues
are resolved before trial or during trial, they must be resolved atsomepoint in the proceeding.
The process is inefficient no matter when it occurs.
126. Sedler & Twerski, State Choice of Law, supra note 116, at 633. According to
Professor Kramer, because states tend to copy one another's laws; there will be a limited
number of different choice-of-law rules, thereby reducing the number of conflicts "to a
relatively manageable number." Kramer, supra note 47, at 582-83.
127. Kastenmeier & Geyh, supra note 72, at 548-49; see also supra note 117.
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"regardlessof whether the cases are small or large."' "[N]umerous judges and
scholars have recognized that the burden duplicative litigation places on the courts is
tort or products liability cases. It is also
not due solely to a very few, high profile toxic
29
attributableto smaller cases as well....,,1
Equity
ii.
Critics have also suggested that the present choice-of-law regime is unjust for a
number ofreasons. 3 First, the present system tends to produce duplicative litigation
that can lead to inconsistent and unfair legal results. 3 ' Choice-of-law problems often
force mass-tort plaintiffs to litigate their claims apart from other similarly situated
parties. 3 2 As a result, individual plaintiffs with otherwise identical claims may not
achieve the same legal result because two different factfinders may interpret the facts
or law differently." This can cause "striking disparities" in the recoveries ofsimilarly
situated victims, with the plaintiffs' fates depending "less on the justice oftheir causes
than on their selection of an initial forum."''" Most scholars and judges agree that
equity requires that cases involving identical or substantially similar facts must be
treated equally under the law,"3 and some scholars even go so far as to argue that

128. Kastenmeier & Geyh, supra note 72, at 549 (emphasis added).
129. Id. (emphasis added).
130. See, e.g., id. at 551-52; Reavley & Wesevich, supranote 50, at 24; Rubin, supra note
19, at 436.
131. See Rubin, supra note 19, at 436 ("A just legal system would allot the benefits and
costs ofn[mass] tort litigation rationally and equitably."); see also Kastenmeier & Geyh, supra
note 72, at 55 1.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 66-91.
133. Kastenmeier & Geyh, supra note 72, at 551. Kastenmeier & Geyh offer an example
from a mass tort based on an airline disaster, although the situation can easily be analogized
to apply to other mass torts:
'Two passengers sitting side by side in the same airplane are killed in the same
crash, and their families file identical wrongful death suits against the airline
in different courts. Under current law, it is possible that the airline could be
found negligent in one suit, but not in the other, entitling the family of one
victim to receive complete compensation for its loss, while the family of the
other victim receives a bill for court costs.... [However, w]hen the identical
issues of law and fact arising out of the same accident are resolved one way in
sone cases and another way in others, due solely to the vagaries of thejudges
and juries, it is, in a word, unfair.
Id. at 551-52.
134. Juenger, supra note 73, at 109 (noting that this situation also "increases the
likelihood of discrimination among different classes of victims").
135. Reavley & Wesevich, supra note 50, at 24 ("Judges, legislators, and academics all
echo our condemnation of this disparate legal treatment as unfair."); see also Bird, supra note
59, at 1087 n.50 (noting that Erie was designed "to ensure that litigants with the same kind of
case would have their rights measured by the same legal standards of liability") (quoting Pope
&Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406,410 (1953)).
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136
equal treatment of similar claims is a "fundamental principle of American law."'
Second, scholars note that the current system's inequity affects mass-tort
defendants as well.'3 Indeed, because many mass-tort cases potentially implicate the
laws of numerous states, a court's interpretation of its own state's choice-of-law
doctrine may result in the application of a .substantive legal standard that the
defendants could not have foreseen."" To the extent that choice-of-law jurisprudence
attempts to protect the reasonable and justified expectations of the parties to a

lawsuit, 39 this outcome is unjust.

Finally, the current system tends to thwart one of the primary goals of the tort
system-to compensate injured victims fairly and adequately." As noted above, the
current system tends to frustrate the procedural mechanisms that enable courts to
adjudicate mass-tort lawsuits collectively, thereby fostering duplicative litigation.'4'
By forcing certain plaintiffs to litigate their claims individually, the present regime
prevents plaintiffs from taking advantage of the gain in bargaining power-relative
to the defendants-that a group of plaintiffs enjoys by litigating their claims
collectively. 42 Also, collective adjudication of a mass tort tends to lower the risk that

136. Bird, supra note 59, at 1087.
137. Briggs L. Tobin, The 'Limited Generosity' ClassAction and a Uniform Choice of
Law Rule: An Approach to FairandEffectiveMass-Tort PunitiveDamageAdjudication in the
FederalCourts,38 EMORY L.J. 457,483 (1989). As Kastenmeier and Geyh note:
The unfairness that duplicative litigation may precipitate... includes multiple
assessments of punitive damages against the same defendant for the same
conduct. Just as it is appropriate for a criminal defendant to be punished only
once for the same crime, so too, it is appropriate for a civil defendant to be
assessed punitive damages only once for the same conduct. To the extent that
separate, duplicative civil proceedings against the same defendant, or
defendants, give rise to the possibility of duplicative punitive damage awards,
the risk of unfair results is undeniable.
Kastenmeier & Geyh, supra note 72, at 552.
138. Tobin, supra note 137, at 483.
139. The most widely used choice-of-law approach, that ofthe Second Restatement of the
Law of Conflict of Laws, SCOLES ETAL, supranote 21, §2.23, at 96-101, specifically lists the
goal of protecting justified party expectations as a factor that courts should consider in
determining the applicable law. REST. 2d CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2)(d) (1969).
140. See, e.g., REST. 2d CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 cmt. b (1969).
141. See supra notes 88-115 and accompanying text.
142. Bird, supranote 59, at 1085. Undoubtedly, a group of one thousand injured plaintiffs
has more bargaining power against a potentially liable defendant-often a large corporation
in mass toxic tort cases-than a single plaintiff would have. Additionally, in some situations
it may be the case that,
without consolidation [of dispersed lawsuits] many claimants will be unable
to test their claims at all. The stakes could be too small tojustify independent
litigation, or-more likely in the mass tort context-the cost of litigating each
claim separately could exhaust the defendants' assets before a judgment is
obtained. If so, consolidation may be necessary to prevent [unfairness].
Kramer, supra note 47, at 581.
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plaintiffs who sue early on will deplete the available pool of compensation funds
before other equally deserving-but tardier-plaintiffs can also obtain recovery.143To
the extent that the current system fiustrates collective adjudication, it also exacerbates
this inequity problem.
While the majority of scholars believes that the present, system is inequitable,'"
there is once again a vocal minority that challenges this view. 45 The minority
challenges the consensus view that it is unfair for similarly situated mass-tortplaintiffs
tobe subjected to potentially inconsistent and disparate legal outcomes when they sue
in different states. 46 Professor Larry Kramer argues that
there is nothing "unfair" if victims of the same mass tort are compensated
differently-at least, not if they are from or were injured in different states.
Such differences in outcome reflect the fact that different states with legitimate
interests have made different judgments about how to handle
tort problems.
47
Different outcomes are thus both expected and acceptable.
These minority scholars argue that the "inherent fallacy" in the consensus view is
"the assumption that accident victims are 'similarly situated,' simply because they
have been involved in the same accident."' 48 The minority would argue that if
domiciliaries of different states were simultaneously injured side-by-side in the same
mass tort, they would nevertheless not necessarily be "similarly situated" because the
domiciliaries' respective
states might establish varying rights and liabilities based on
49
the same set of facts.

143. Bird, supranote 59, at 1079, 1085 ("[F]rom society's point of view, equity requires
that victims of mass torts receive prompt, adequate, and effective compensation for their
injuries.").
144. See, e.g., Kastenmeier & Geyh, supra note 72, at 551-52; Reavley & Wesevich,
supranote 50, at 24; Rubin, supranote 19, at 436.
145. See generally Kramer, supra note 47; Sedler & Twerski, Sacrifice Without Gain,
supranote 116; .Sedler & Twerski, State Choice ofLaw, supra note 116.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 130-36.
147. Kramer, supra note 47, at 579. Professors Sedler and Twerski argue that,
"[i]nconsistency of result" in the "mass toxic tort" situation... exists because
different states, in the exercise of their traditional sovereignty, have adopted
different substantive rules in the products liability area. Different results reached
by courts in determining the legal rights of private persons in litigation is, as the
Supreme Court has observed, "part of the price of our federal system."
Sedler & Twerski, Sacrifice Without Gain,supra note 116, at 96-97 (quoting Williams v.
North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 302 (1942)). "The 'inefficiencies' in multiple litigation of
the same underlying claim in different courts are 'built-into' our federal system." Id. at 95.
148. Sedler & Twerski, State Choice of Law, supra note 116, at 636.
149. Id.
They are similarly situated only in the sense that they have been involved in the
same accident. But they are not similarly situated with respect to the policies
embodied in the laws of the involved states nor the interests of the involved states
in having their laws applied in order to implement the policy reflected in those
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Scholars who espouse the majority view have offered rebuttal. One scholar urged
that "society's interest and the interests of individual victims in the integrity of mass
tort adjudication require that the principles of equity [in preventing inconsistent,
disparate legal outcomes] ... override competing values of federalism in mass tort
litigation."' 5 ° Others add that the minority "ignores states' interests in [securing] equal
treatment for their citizens,"'' and that "[i]n cases arising from accidents that injure
people from several states, a state's interest in obtaining equal treatment for its
citizens could ...outweigh its interest in perpetuating the policy expressed in its tort
and choice-of-law rules."' 52
To be fair, it should be noted that the minority scholars do not completely deny that
mass-tort litigation itselfimposes burdens on the courts. 3 While admitting that
legitimate problems do actually exist, they challenge the majority's characterization
of the current choice-of-law regime as an evil that must be rectified.'4 Instead, they
embrace mass-tort choice-of-law problems (and the disparate and inconsistent legal
outcomes that result therefrom), and favorably refer to the problems alternatively as
merely "what a federal system is all about"' s and "something to be embraced and
affirmatively valued."'" In other words, they believe-primarily because of their
strong valuation of federalism and the "states as a laboratory" conceptS--that the
"problems" the current choice-of-law regime creates are not problems at all.
According to Professor Sedler, mass-tort litigation does raise "legitimate concern for
efficiency and the avoidance of duplicative litigation!'; however, "[tihese concerns
can properly be addressed by consolidating mass tort cases for trial before a single
court" without changing the current choice-of-law regime."' ProfessorKramer notes:
"I do not mean to minimize the seriousness of the problem posed by complex
litigation ....
[However], there are ways to consolidate and adjudicate without
rewriting the parties' rights" by changing the current choice-of-law regime."6 As a
result, these scholars urge that if mass-tort litigation were to be reformed, the reforms

laws.
Id. "Reasonable people can understand that different legal systems provide different rights
to their respective residents." Id. at 635.
150. Bird, supra note 59, at 1088.
15 1. Reavley & Wesevich, supra note 50, at 26.
152. Id. at 25.
153. See Kramer, supranote 47, at 581; Sedler, supra note 3, at 1110.
154. See Kramer, supra note 47, at 581; Sedler, supra note 3, at 1110.
155. Kramer, supra note 47, at 579.
156. Id.
157. See Justice Brandeis's ode to scientific-method federalism in his dissent in New State
Ice Co. v.Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis J.,
dissenting).
158. Sedler, supra note 3, at 11I0.
159. Id.
160. Kramer, supra note 47, at 581. Professor Kramer argues that choice-of-law rules are
by their nature substantive, not procedural, because they effectively define a party's rights in
a lawsuit by determining which state's substantive tort law will govern the case. Id. at 572-73.
To this extent, changing the current choice-of-law regime will, in his opinion, inappropriately
change the substantive rights of the parties. Id.
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should not change the present choice-of-law regime.'
In sum, it appears clear that despite the vocal minority's belief that mass-tort
litigation is in practice quite manageable, the experience of judges and practitioners
demonstrates otherwise. 62 The current system is indeed inefficient. The current
system is probably also inequitable, but this determination may hinge on one's
personal belief in what is "fair." Even if the minority's equity argument is persuasive,
in all probability the inefficiency of the current system by itself may provide sufficient
justification to consider reforming the system.

I1."GROUND ZERO"' 63 TOXIC TORTS: THE INEVITABLE PROBLEM
In the weeks and months following the destruction of the World Trade Center on
September 11, 2001, concern developed about the potentially dangerous
environmental situiation around Ground Zero.'" Indeed, numerous environmental tests
and studies suggested that the collapse of the towers and the subsequent fires that
burned at the site had unleashed toxic substances, including asbestos, into Lower
Manhattan.' As the weeks passed, countless people living and working around the
sitebeganto experience adverse health effects. As a result, it is probably reasonable
to surmise that of the hundreds of thousands of workers, residents, and visitors who
were in Lower Manhattan on or after September 11, thousands of these people may
have been exposed to toxins capable of causing serious short-term and long-term
health effects. 61" Because thousands ofpeople were potentially exposed, mass toxictort litigation will likely erupt as ailing plaintiffs, arguably sickened by exposure to
toxins near Ground Zero, bring forth their claims.
This Part begins by discussing the environmental dangers created by the World
Trade Center's destruction. Then, this Part explores the debilitating effect that choiceof-law issues would have on any future mass toxic-tort litigation.

161. Kramer, supra note 47, at 581; see also Sedler, supra note 3, at 1110.
162. See supranote 120.
163. Shortly after the attacks, the media began colloquially referring to the area
surrounding the site where the World Trade Center once stood as "Ground Zero' Richard P.
Campbell, The View from the Chair: Tort-Model Compensation, BRIEF, Winter 2002, at 4
(American Bar Association Tort & Insurance Practice Section).
164. See, e.g., Margaret Ramirez, Airing Their Health Concerns, NEWSDAY, Nov. 27,
2001, at A6.
165. See Juan Gonzalez, A Toxic Nightmare at Disaster Site: Air, Water, Soil
Contaminated,N.Y. DAILY NEws, Oct. 26, 2001, at 2; see also Christine Haughney, In N.Y.
Taking a Breath ofFear; IllnessesBringNew Doubts About Toxic Exposure Near Ground
Zero, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2002, at Al.
166. See Pete Donohue & Frank Lombardi, Downtown Air's Risky, M.D. Warns, N.Y.
DAILYNEWS, Nov. 9,2001, at 8; see alsoDelthiaRicks,LungAilmentsEmerge;MDs: Ground
Zero WorkersAffected, NEWSDAY, Jan. 20, 2002, at A7.
167. See infra text accompanying notes 207-10.
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A. The EnvironmentalDangerat Ground Zero
The twin towers of the World Trade Center were built between 1968 and 1972.68
During construction, builders sprayed an asbestos/cement slurry mixture onto the
towers' steel lattice to insulate it from fire. 69 New York City banned this practice in
1971, but not before builders had already applied hundreds of tons of the mixture. 7 '
At least forty stories of the north tower reportedly still contained this mixture when
the towers collapsed,' 7' and the towers contained untold quantities of asbestoscontaining products in the towers' floors, ceilings, and walls."T In addition, the World
Trade Center complex housed a chemical bulk storage facility, numerous entities that
generated hazardous waste, and several storage tanks for petroleum products, 73
including two electrical substations containing 109,000 gallons of oil.'74 A mindboggling array ofmaterials, some of them capable of causing serious long-termhealth
effects, were undoubtedly incinerated, pulverized, and aerosolized because of the
attacks.' 75 For more than three months after the attack, fires consumed the Ground
Zero rubble and unleashed an unknown "chemical soup" of smoke and fumes. 76
As the towers collapsed, a massive dust cloud containing millions of tons of
airborne particles enveloped much of Lower Manhattan and its hundreds of thousands
of workers and residents.'"7 Although the exact composition of the dust cloud is
unknown, one scientist, after analyzing Ground Zero debris, determined that the cloud
likely contained a variety of chemical compounds and carcinogens, including asbestos,
in addition to pulverized concrete and fiberglass.' 8 The potential health effect of this
"single burst, heavy dose" exposure is uncertain, but some research suggests that a
massive singular dose of a carcinogen like asbestos could be enough to cause lethal

168. Michael B. Gerrard, World Trade Center. Response, Recovery and Reconstruction,
N.Y.L.J., Oct. 4, 2001, at 3.
169. Id.
170. Id. One source reported that construction workers had sprayed over 5000 tons of
asbestos before the practice was banned. Asbestos, Lead, PCB Exposure PotentialRisk of
EnvironmentalAftermathfrom WTC Collapse,INTERNET WIRE, at 2001 WL 29913960.
171. Kimberley A.Strassel, The EPA Comes Clean on Asbestos, WALL ST. J., Oct. 19,
2001, at Al4.
172. Andrew Schneider, Asbestos at GroundZero: The DustSettles at GroundZero, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 13, 2002, at Al; see also Traci Watson, UncertaintySurrounds
Asbestos, USA TODAY, Feb. 7, 2002, at A6.
173. Gerrard, supranote 168.
174. Sharon L. Crenson, Release ofPoisonFearedat Center; TransformersHeld Toxins,
SOUTH FLORIDA SUN-SENTINEL, Jan. 20, 2002, at 13A.
175. Mark Maremont &Jared Sandberg, WeighingRisks: Tests SayAir Is Safe, But Some
PeopleFeel Ill Near Ground Zero, WALL ST. J., Dec. 26,2001, at Al.
176. Id. As one observer stated, "[y]ou had 210 [sic] floors of carpets, wallboard, furniture
and computers burning. We have no idea'what this will do." Susan Q. Stranahan, Track Their
Health Now, to ProtectOthersLater, WASH. POST, Jan. 20,2002, at B2.
177. Jon Laor, Rutgers Lecture Addresses Health Risks, Pollutants at Ground Zero,
DALY TARGUM, Feb. 18,2002,2002 WL 12486838.
178. Maremont & Sandberg, supra note 175.
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disease.' 79
Shortly after the attack, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") began
taking samples to test outdoor air quality."' The EPA reported that although initial
asbestos levels in Lower Manhattan had exceeded federal standards,n8 subsequent
EPA tests indicated no excessive levels of toxic substances except directly around
Ground Zero.'82 A week after the attack, EPA Administrator Christie Todd Whitman
declared New York's air and water to be safe. 3 However, as workers and residents
tried to return to their normal lives amidst reports of their neighbors' respiratory
problems, headaches, and nausea,'u doubts about the accuracy of the EPA's
assurances soon began to surface. 5' Responding to an environmental group's
Freedom of Information Act" request in late October, the EPA released previously
undisclosed data indicating that the release of toxic chemicals from Ground Zero may
have been far more extensive than initially believed.' Indeed, the data revealed that
from mid-September to mid-October, the EPA had detected dioxins, PCBs, benzene,
lead, chromium, copper, and sulfur dioxide-sometimes at levels far exceeding
federal standards-in the air and soil around Ground Zero and in the Hudson River. "
Despite continued reassurances from the EPA that the air was safe," 9 many New
Yorkers distrusted the government's findings"9 and began to mobilize to ensure the

179. Schneider, supra note 172. In any event, one scientist noted that "people were
breathing in stuffthat was far in excess of what anybody would normally be exposed to in their
lifetime." Maremont & Sandberg, supra note 175; see also Maia Davis, Dust From WTC
ContainedWitches'BrewofPollutants-ResearcherUrgesHealthEffects Study,RECORD, Feb.
16, 2002, at A17, 2002 WL 4646495.
180. Margaret Ramirez, America's Ordeal!Whitman: City Air No Threat to Health,
NEWSDAY, Oct. 13,2001, at A17, 2001 WL 9255628.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Haughney, supra note 165.
184. See, e.g., BreathingProblemsReportedatSchool, MILWAUKEE J.SENTINEL, Oct. 19,
2001, at 14A (reporting that about eighty teachers and students from a high school near Ground
Zero complained of medical problems after returning to the school on October 9).
185. See, e.g., id.
186. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
187. See Judy Fahys, Utah Company Snifs Out Hazards at World Trade CenterSite,
SALTLAKETRIB., Oct. 23,2001 (describing Ground Zero as 'basicallyahazardous-waste site"
and noting that when workers around the site breathe, "they risk inhaling a toxic brew of
dangerous particles"); see also Gonzalez, supra note 165; Toxin Levels Elevated at Trade
Center Site, CED. TRIB., Oct. 28,2001, at 10.
188. Gonzalez, supra note 165. For example, one EPA test on October 11, 2001, found
levels of benzene, a chemical that can cause leukemia, that were fifty-eight times higher than
Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA")limits. Haughney, supranote 165.
In an EPA test on September 26, 2001, three samples close to Ground Zero showed elevated
lead readings. Id.
189. Heather Won Tesoriero, Double Agony, TIME, Oct. 29, 2001, at F5.
190. Wondering why the EPA did not voluntarily disclose worrisome test results for
nearly a month, some residents and commentators questioned the EPA's honesty. See, e.g.,
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safety of their neighborhoods. 9 ' Local tenant groups, unions, and political leaders
hired civilian scientists and doctors to conduct private tests and studies. " The results
were disturbing for a number of reasons. First, these private experts concluded that
asbestos levels in reality may have been substantially higher than EPA test results had
indicated because of the asbestos particles' unusually small size." They argued that
the force of the towers' collapse may have pulverized the asbestos materials into
minute particles too small for EPA instruments to detect.' Second, numerous studies
found that indoorasbestos levels in Lower Manhattan residences and businesses had
been dangerously high.9 One study found that the air in four buildings near Ground
Zero, two of which were residential and two of which were commercial, had had
asbestos levels exceeding the federal safety standards." Subsequent tests found
similar results,"9 including one study that found a Lower Manhattan apartment to have
asbestos-laden dust 555 times greater than acceptable levels. 9 Finally, two
independent studies released in February 2002 highlighted the, severity of the
pollution.' One study found that during the first six weeks after the attack, levels of

Josh Getlin, N.Y. Air's Purity a MatterofDispute, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2002, at Al. Perhaps
responding to these concerns, the EPA's ombudsman ordered an investigation into charges that
the agency concealed evidence of hazardous conditions in Lower Manhattan. Russ Buettner,
Battle Over EPA Denials of DangersDowntown, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 12, 2002, at 6,
available at 2002 WL 3163569. InFebruary 2002, a congressional hearing was held to
investigate the propriety of the EPA's actions. See Jared Sandberg, Risk ofAir Near Ground
Zero Still Unclear,WALL. ST. J., Feb, 12, 2002, at B4B.
191. See, e.g., Ramirez, supra note 164 (reporting that city and state officials called for
the establishment of an agency to oversee environmental testing in Lower Manhattan);
Elizabeth Hays, ParentsCall Excavation Barge a Health Threat,N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 1,
2001, at 10, available at 2001 WL 27986132 (reporting that local parents demanded that a
barge carrying wreckage be moved from its berth in the Hudson River because of air quality
concerns).
192. Schneider, supra note 172.
193. Haughney, supra note 165; see also Getlin, supra note 190.
194. Haughney, supra note 165; see also Getlin, supra note 190.
195. See, e.g., Josh Benson, TheAir Downtown: Tests Call It Clean, But CoughsAbound,
N.Y. OBSERVER, Jan. 7, 2002, availableat 2002 WL 5164325.
196. Juan Gonzalez, Feds, City Ignore Asbestos Cleanup Rules, Says EPA Vet, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS, Nov. 20, 2001, at 8, availableat 2001 WL 27987983.
197. One study found that three randomly selected apartments near Ground Zero
contained carpets and curtains that were "inundated with dustthat was laden with copious
amounts of asbestos" and other hazardous materials. Benson, supra note 195. Another study
found "dangerously high levels of asbestos" coating a nearby playground. Id.Yetanother study
found several indoor samples to be contaminated with asbestos in excess of four times the
federal safety guideline. Getlin, supra note 190.
198. Haughney, supra note 165.
199. Andrew Bridges, 9-11 Air Pollution Unmatched: Fine ParticlesSeen as Factorin
Illnesses, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Feb. 12, 2002, at 3A; see also Andrew Schneider,
Public Was Never Told That Dust From Ruins Is Caustic: Scientists Found Residue as
Corrosive asDrain Cleaner, ST. Louis POST-DISPATcH, Feb. 10, 2002, at Al.
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certain pollutants had been the highest ever recorded,"trumping those measured in
Kuwait after Iraqi invaders torched oil wells during the Gulf War."" ° Another study
found that the World Trade Center dust had been as caustic as ammonia or even liquid
drain cleaner.2 '
As mounting evidence continued to call into question the safety of indoor
conditions, a wave of concern arose among the owners, managers, and residents of
corporate and residential buildings around Ground Zero. 2 Specifically, they feared
that hazardous dust had seeped into their buildings-some of which had alreadybeen
reoccupied-and that this dust was being recirculated by the buildings' ventilation
systems.' Indeed, as one observer soberly stated:
I spoke to one of the people who works in a building nearby, and her office
was brought back a week or 10 days after the collapse of the Trade Towers.
Everyone there was complaining about scratchy throats and watery eyes and
coughing. And a memo came down [from their company's chiefhealth officer]
saying, "You know, it's like going to a campfire, you're going to cough,
you're going to have burning eyes." But these people have been going down
there... five days a week for the last month, month and a half, ingesting this
2 4
stuff.
Further exacerbating the problem was the fact many nearby buildings had been
cleaned in a haphazard manner that failed to eliminate the health risks presented by
the dust.20 5 In fact, these slapdash attempts to remove the dust may have only served
to increase the danger to the public.'0
Because of these environmental dangers, one must frighteningly conclude that tens
of thousands of people may have been put at risk from exposure to toxic substances.

200. Bridges, supra note 199, at 3A.
201. Schneider, supranote 199, at Al.
202. Mark Riley, Asbestos: The New Danger,THE AGE, Oct. 31,2001, at 13, available
at 2001 WL 28698816.
203. Id.
204. The O'Reilly Factor(Fox News broadcast, Oct. 29, 2001), 2001 WL 5081851,
(quoting an interview with Newsweek Senior Editor David France).
205. Benson, supra note 195; see also Jared Sandberg, CleaningDust Improperly Can
CreateNew Hazards,WALL ST. J., Dec. 26,2001, at A4. The New York DailyNews reported
that a veteran EPA scientist recently wrote a "scathing" internal memo accusing the EPA of
handling the situation in Lower Manhattan irresponsibly. Gonzalez, supra note 196. The
scientist stated that the EPA erred by recommending that residents and commercial building
managers around Ground Zero follow the "extremely lenient (and arguably illegal) asbestos
guidelines of the New York City Department of Health." Id. Noting that "EPA regulations do
not allow anyone to oversee and perform ...asbestos removal, such as a resident in an
apartment building orabuilding owner," she criticized the EPA for offering "ludicrous" advice
such as, "[i]f curtains need to be taken down, take them down slowly to keep dust from
circulating." Id.
206. Benson, supra note 195; see also Sandberg, supra note 205.
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Indeed, many people have already experienced adverse health effects.' 7 With over
100,000 workers and 10,000 residents returning to Lower Manhattan in the weeks and
months after the attackl 0 3-not to mention the thousands of rescue workers who toiled
at the site2 ---doctors have encountered an unanticipated volume of serious
respiratory ailments among people who lived or worked around Ground Zero."'
With thousands of people claiming symptoms of what has been dubbed "World
Trade Center syndrome, ' ..2 insurance companies and lawyers for New York City have
expressed concern about the potential legal consequences. Expecting the city to be
"hit with suits over the cleanup," ' New York City successfully lobbied Congress to
cap the city's liability to potential injured plaintiffs.214 Insurance companies, perhaps
heeding doctors' warnings of an upcoming potential outbreak of illness that could
"rival the Gulf War and Agent Orange syndromes in its medical and legal
implications," ' 5 tried to assess the risks." 6 As Money reported:

207. See, e.g., Ricks, supra note 166.
208. "On Sept. 18,just one week after the World Trade Center collapse, tens ofthousands
of office workers.., were given the go-ahead by federal and local safety officials to return to
theirjobs." Juan Gonzalez, Castinga DarkCloud Over City, EPA, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 12,
2002, at 26, 2002 WL 3166409; see also Asbestos & Lead Abatement Report, Dec. 1, 2001,
availableat 2001 WL 14957926; Mei Fong, LandlordsEntice TenantsBackto GroundZero,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 2002, at B I (reporting that about 9000 people lived in nearby Battery
Park City before the attack); The O'Reilly Factor(Fox News broadcast, Oct. 29, 2001), 2001
WL 5081851, (quoting an interview with Newsweek Senior Editor David France).
209. Breath ofLife, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 14,2002, at 6A.
210. Donohue & Lombardi, supra note 166. This news article reported that the medical
director of occupational and environmental diseases at New York's Mount Sinai Medical
Center "strongly disputed assurances by government officials ... that air in the neighborhood
poses no long-term health risks, except at Ground Zero." Id. The doctor stated that his "clinical
experience tells us something quite different," for his hospital had been seeing more instances
of"airway dysfunction" problems among patients "who work in office buildings [that are] two,
three, and four blocks from Ground Zero." Id.
211. Beth Daley, Health Fallout Remains Up in the Air, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 9,2001,
at A17.
212. Walter Updegrave, How Strong Is the Safety Net? Here's a Look at How Insurers
Will Shoulder the Burdenforthe LargestDisasterthe Industry HasEver Faced,MONEY, Nov.
1,2001, at 130; see also James Brewer, InsurersMust FillAsbestos War Chests, LLOYD'S LIST
INT'L, Dec. 19, 2001, available2001 WL 31407265.
213. N.Y. Official FearsCity WillFaceSuits Pertainingto Cleanup, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 27,
2001, at A13. The Los Angeles Times quotes New York's corporation counsel as saying: "The
single biggest issue that we're dealing with now is liability ... and in maybe 10 to 15 years

from now, with people saying they got asthma or asbestos or lung injury." Id.
214. See Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 102, 115 Stat.
597 (2001).

215. Riley, supra note 202 (noting that both the Gulf War and Agent Orange syndromes
"led to successful class-action lawsuits").
216. Updegrave, supra note 212; see also Brewer, supra note 212.
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One major issue [is] possible asbestos contamination in the wake of the
buildings' collapse. "That's a huge liability that could come into play," says
Matthew Mosher, group vice president of property/casualty ratings at A.M.
Best. "All this new exposure could have an impact in terms of cost that will
take years to figure out." Any calculation of the cost of these claims is
obviously iffy at best, which is why analysts' estimates range from $8 billion
to $20 billion.217

In sum, although there is a great deal of uncertainty, a growing body of clinical and
scientific evidence suggests that thousands of people who lived in, worked in, or
visited Lower Manhattan may now be at risk of suffering adverse health effects
because of the dangerous environmental situation that existed around Ground Zero.
As a result, the possibility that ailing plaintiffs will turn to the courts for relief is a
looming prospect.
B. The Choice-of-Law Problem in September-l]-BasedMass Toxic Torts
The environmentally dangerous situation that existed in Lower Manhattan suggests
the possibility that over the next ten to twenty years, thousands of plaintiffs
experiencing health problems may file claims alleging that their injuries were caused
by exposure to toxic substances around Ground Zero in the weeks and months after
September 11, 2001. Judge Jack Weinstein, an expert in mass-tort litigation, stated
that there could be "potentially thousands and thousands" of September- 1-based
cases that will be "scattered all over, with different judges burdened by the same
essential facts in the law.""21 Agreeing with Judge Weinstein's sentiment, some
practitioners have anticipated that the number of cases and types of claims could be
219
"beyond imagination."
To be sure, early indications suggest that some of this anticipated litigation may
already be on the horizon. 2 Over thirteen hundred people, many of whom were
rescue workers at Ground Zero, have already notified New York City that they may
sue for a total of$7.18 billion for damages stemming from the attack.22' These notices
reserve the individuals' right to allege that they had been exposed to "dangerous
levels" of toxins due to the city's "negligence, carelessness, and recklessness" in not
providing them with proper protective gear during their work at the site. 2 In addition,
more than one hundred people have already notified the Port Authority of New York
and New Jersey, which was the owner ofthe World Trade Center, about their possible

217. Updegrave, supra note 212 (emphasis added).
218. Sarah Sparks &Milo Geyelin, New York's Recovery: Experts Offer Ways to Manage
TerrorLawsuits,WALl ST. J., Sept. 25, 2001, at A10.
219. Freedman, supranote 83, at 62 (stating that plaintiffs' lawyers anticipate "thousands
upon thousands of claims").
220. See, e.g., John J. Goldman, Response to Terror: N.Y. Rescue Workers Move to Sue
Over Respiratory Damage, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 12, 2002, at Al0.
221. Id.; see also Michael Weissenstein, 1,300 Take Steps to Sue New York City, STATE,
Feb. 8,2002, at Al1l, availableat 2002 WL 4529794.
222. Goldman, supranote 220.
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intent to sue.' Finally, in February 2002, a group of Lower Manhattan tenants filed
what is arguably the first "World Trade Center syndrome" lawsuit." 4 The tenants in
the case, which included testimony by an indoor air quality specialist whom the court
recognized as "an expert in World Trade Center dust contamination," sought to
require their landlord to rid their apartments of World Trade Center dust.'
If and when widescale litigation ensues, the plaintiffs will most likely be
geographically widespread for a number of reasons. First, New York City has an
extraordinarily cosmopolitan population." 6 For example, because of Lower
Manhattan's status as the undisputed center of American-if not world-finance,"
countless thousands of residents of different states and foreign countries undoubtedly
worked or lived in Lower Manhattan on or after September 11. Indeed, residents of
more thanflifty foreign countries, not to mention numerous states, were killed when
the towers collapsed.' It is probably reasonable to assume that similarly diverse
populations inhabited or visited neighboring buildings, including those on Wall Street
and in the World Financial Center, during or after the attacks. In addition, Lower
Manhattan is home to a number of major universities, including New York
University,2" that undoubtedly have students and faculty from across the nation and
world. Finally, because New York City welcomes hundreds of thousands of tourists
and visitors each year, it is likely that many thousands of these people passed through
Lower Manhattan on or after September 11.
Second, the potential environmental effects of September 11 have literally spanned
the globe. For example, thousands of people from across the country rushed to New
York to aid in the rescue and recovery operations." Four hundred fifty rescue
workers came from California alone." Since returning to their home states, many of

223. Weissenstein, supra note 221.
224. Graham Rayman, Tenants vs. Landlordin WTC Cleanup Case, NEWSDAY, Feb. 15,
2002, at A06, availableat 2002 WL 2728252.
225. Id.The expert testified that "nearly five months after the attacks, he found the telltale
black and gray dust in several apartments, in the stairwell and on or near fans, air conditioners
and other ventilation areas." Id.
226. Organizations that plan to study the health effects of the situation in Lower
Manhattan have themselves noted that "[t]he studies are expected to be 'intensely complicated'
due to demographics of the area"-a "mix of workers, commuters and tourists." WTC: Studies
Look for Health Risk From Exposure to Debris,AMERICAN POLITICAL NETWORK AMERICAN
HEALTH LINE, Jan. 11,2002, at 17, available at WL APN-HE 17.
227. Stevenson Swanson, Sense ofPeril Slows Revival ofManhattan: Despite Progress,
Some Businesses, Residents Leaving, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 29, 2001, at 3.
228. Stanley Crouch, Killers' Only 'Cause' Was Killing, N.Y. DAiLY NEWS, Sept. 20,
2001, at 57.
229. See Jesse Logan, NYU to Test for Toxic Air in Downtown Dorms, WASH. SQUARE
NEWS, Mar. 7, 2002, available at 2002 WL 14816173.
230. See, e.g., Jessie Seyfer, Rescue-Team Coughs Worse Than After Oklahoma City
Blast, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 9, 2002, at A3, available at 2002 WL 3886953; Matthew B.
Stannard, Cough Lingering in State Firefighters Who Helped in N.Y.,"S.F. CHRON., Dec. 25,
2001, at AI,availableat 2001 WL 3423433.
231. Seyfer, supra note 230.
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these workers have experienced adverse health effects? 2 In addition, over a thousand
Southern Baptists from around the country and over 600 immigrants, many of whom
were undocumented, came to Lower Manhattan to help clean the asbestos-laden
homes and offices of displaced residents and workers. 3 Subsequent medical
examinations found that more than 400 of these laborers had exhibited symptoms of
respiratory distress arguably caused by their exposure to World Trade Center dust and
debris.14 Finally, the World Trade Center pollution itself may have crossed state and
international borders. One study suggested that airborne toxins emanating from
Ground Zero may have crossed the Hudson River into New Jersey." Halfway around
the globe, environmental activists in India have expressed concern that Indian salvage
companies may have received contaminated scrap metal from Ground Zero."
Third, potential plaintiffs may have changed their domicile by the time they bring
their claims, thereby increasing the number of states that have a connection to the
lawsuit for purposes of choice-of-law analysis." 7 For example, if a potential plaintiff
had been exposed to toxic dust while living in New York, but subsequently sued after
having moved to another state, each of those states might have an interest in having
its substantive law applied because of its respective connection to the case. Such a
situationwould undoubtedly make the court's choice-of-law inquiry more complex.?23
Unfortunately, because of the latency period of the health problems from which
potential plaintiffs might suffer," it may take these plaintiffs years to discover their

232. Gonzalez, supra note 208 (reporting that half of the rescue workers from an Ohio
contingent had become ill since returning home); see also David Perlman, Toxic Clouds
Billowed Above Twin Tower Site: Expert Says ParticlesWere Worst Ever Measured, S.F.
CHRON., Feb. 12, 2002, at A I, availableat 2002 WL 4012576 (reporting that seventy percent
ofthe rescue workers from a Menlo Park contingent had reported being sick upon their return
to California); Seyfer, supra note 230; Brad Smith, Ground Zero Workers BreathlessAfter
Ordeal,TAMPA TRIB., Feb. 23, 2002, at 1, availableat 2002 WL 6541733; Stannard, supra
note 230.
233. Alison Leigh Cowan, God's CleaningSquad: Southern Baptists Help Apartment
DwellersReturn, SOUTH FLORIDA SUN-SENTINEL, Dec. 9, 200 1, at 3A, availableat 2001 WL
29960362; John Moreno Gonzalez, Immigrants Risk Healthfor Wages, NEWSDAY, Jan. 13,
2002, at A08, availableat 2002 WL 2722752.
234. Margaret Ramirez, Breathing ProblemsDetected at WTC: 400 Workers Display
SimilarSymptoms, NEWSDAY, Mar. 2,2002, at A06, availableat 2002 WL 2730840.
235. Laor, supra note 177.
236. WTC Scrap Is Hazardous,Activists Say: Greenpeace Complains That the Metal Is
Contaminated and.EndangeringRecyclers in India, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 18, 2002, at A8. A
director of Greenpeace India stated that "[t]here is every possibility that high levels of toxins
are in the debris that would.pose serious health and environmental risks to uninformed
recycling workers in India." Id.
237. See supra Part I.A.
238. See supra Part I.A.
239. Somemedical conditions caused byexposureto toxic substances do not develop until
many years after the exposure. See, e.g., GERALD W. BOSTON &M. STUART MADDEN, LAW OF
ENVIRONMENTAL AND TOXIC TORTS 5 (2d ed. 2001). For example, mesothelioma, a rare form
of lung cancer caused by exposure to asbestos, may not develop until decades after the
exposure. See Lawrence Martin, Asbestos Lung Disease-A Primerfor Patients,Physicians
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injuries.3 As a result, for example, many plaintiffs Who used to live in New York may
have subsequently established new domiciles.24
Unfortunately, the vast number and large geographical dispersal of potential
plaintiffs would likely cause an immense choice-of-law conundrum ifthe claims were
to be consolidated and adjudicated collectively. Barring federal intervention
modifying the current choice-of-law system, the situation would look like this. Forumshopping incentives, 242coupled withplaintiffs' post-injury relocations, would lead the
plaintiffs to bring suit in countless different states and countries. Whenthese dispersed
cases were consolidated in a federal court-as they probably would be 243 -the judge
would have to make complicated and difficult choice-of-law analyses. Under Klaxon
and Van Dusen,2" in order to determine which substantive tort law would apply to
various claims, the judge would have to apply-for each and every individual
suit-the choice-of-law rules of the state or foreign country from which the individual
suits originated. 43 With potentially thousands of plaintiffs and lawsuits originating
from across the nation and the world, the federal court would be crippled by this
choice-of-law analysis.
Congress, although probably not explicitly intending to address this choice-of-law
problem, partially simplified the problem when itpassed the Air Transportation Safety
and System Stabilization Act 2 (the "Act"). The Act not only requires that "all actions
brought for any claim... resulting from or relating to" the attacks be brought in a
single federal district court,247 but also directs the federal court to apply New York
state choice-of-law doctrine to all the claims.2' As discussed below, however, the Act
does not go far enough in eliminating the massive choice-of-law problems that may
erupt.
The Act, signed into law just eleven days after the attacks, was passed to keep
September- 11-based litigation from getting out of control by limiting the liability of
the airlines 49 and by establishing a federal fund (the "Fund") from which the

andLawyers,athttp://www.mtsinai.org/pulmonary/Asbestos/asbestos-questions.htm (revised
January 2002).
240. Bryan Virasami, Cleanup Worries: Residents, Doctors See WTC Health Risks,
NEWSDAY, Nov. 9, 2001, at A27, availableat 2001 WL 9260605.
241. In fact, some residents have already moved: "Many parents with young children who
lived in Tribeca and Battery Park, the residential areas closest to the site, have moved away."
Philip Delves Broughton, Asbestos Alert at GroundZero, DAiLY TELEGRAPH, Jan. 9,2002, at
P15, availableat 2002 WL 3273082.
242. Forum-shopping incentives, discussed supra text accompanying notes 92-94, will
existso long as theErie/Klaxon/VanDusen trilogy ofcases is still good law when the plaintiffs
bring these suits.
243. See supra text accompanying notes 48-58.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 32-58.
245. See supra text accompanying note 55-58.
246. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 408,
115 Stat. 230 (2001).
247. Id. § 408(b)(3) (emphasis added)
248. Id. § 408(b)(2).
249. Id. § 408(a). On November 19, the act was amended to extend liability caps to a
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government could promptly compensate victims of the attacks. However, the Fund,
whichwas designed to dissuade victims and their families from filing traditional masstort lawsuits," is not available to the vast majority of people who may experience
subsequent health problems because of the pollution around Ground Zero.2 2 Indeed,
the Act limits the availability of the fund to those who were "present at the World
Trade Center... at the time, or in the immediate aftermath" of the crashes253 and who
filed their claims with the Fund within two years.' In promulgating regulations to
implement the Act and the Fund, the Justice Departinent 5 interpreted the Act's
language to require, for Fund eligibility: 1) that Fund claimants have been, during the
first twelve hours after the attack, 6 in the World Trade Center or in the immediate
vicinity such that there had been a "demonstrable risk of physical harm"' from fires,
explosions, or falling debris," and 2) that Fund claimants have experienced a
physical injury that had been treated by a doctor within twenty-four hours, or within
seventy-two hours if the claimant had either been unable to realize immediately the
extent oftheir injuries or had been unable to receive medical treatment on September
1." The physical injury must have either 1) required hospitalization for at least
259
twenty-four hours, or 2) caused "physical disability, incapacity, or disfigurement.)
The Justice Department received numerous comments requesting that the Fund be
available to people who may develop illnesses in the future because of exposure to
toxins that emanated from Ground Zero.' Nevertheless, the Department decided to
exclude this group from the Fund, stating that "Congress did not intend for this Fund

variety of other potential defendants, including the airports from which the doomed flights
originated, the manufacturer of the planes and the planes' engines, the owner and leaseholder
of the World Trade Center, and the City of New York. Aviation and Transportation Security
Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 210, 115 Stat. 697 (2001).
250. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act §§ 401-07.
251. September 1Ith Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,274, 66,274
(Dec. 21, 2001) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 104) [hereinafter Interim Rule].
252. See Interim Rule, supra note 251, at 66,276; see also September l1th Victim
Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,233, 11,234, 11,242 (Mar. 13, 2002) (to be
codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 104) [hereinafter Final Rule].
253. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act § 405(c)(2)(A)(i).
254. Id. § 405(a)(3). The two-year period begins on the date on which the Justice
Department promulgates the statute's regulations. Id. The Justice Department's regulations
went into effect on December 21, 2001. Id. § 407.
255. The statute charges the Justice Department with the task ofpromulgating regulations
to implement the Act. Id. § 407.
256. Interim Rule, supranote 251, at 66,282 (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 104.2(b)).
257. Id. (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 104.2(e)).
258. Id. (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 104.2(c)); Final Rule, supranote 252, at 11,245 (to
be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 104.2(c)). In addition, the administrator of the Fund has discretion
to modify the time period for "rescue personnel who did not or could not obtain treatment by
a medical professional within 72 hours." Final Rule, supra note 252, at 11,245.
259. Interim Rule, supranote 251, at 66,282 (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 104.2(c)).
260. See, e.g., Letter Regarding Victim Compensation Fund, to Kenneth Zwick, DOJ, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/interim/feb 11/N002586.html.
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to cover those who face only a risk of future injury (i.e. latent harm that does not fully
manifest itself within the statutory time period for this Fund)."' According to the
Justice Department, "[w]hile Congress might later consider whether an administrative
program for latent harm caused by [the attack] may be appropriate, the language of
the statute that created this Fund does not contemplate awards for that purpose." 2' As
a result, the Act forces almost all September-l]-basedtoxic-tort plaintiffs to file in
federal court rather than with the Fund.
For injured parties who cannot file a claim with the Fund, the Act provides an
exclusive federal cause of action for "damages arising out of the... crashes." 3 The
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York will have "original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all actions broughtfor any claim... resultingfrom or
relatingto" the crashes, 2' and the governing substantive law for the claims is to "be
derived from the law, includingchoice oflawprinciples,of [New York] unless such
'
law is inconsistent with or preempted by Federal law."265
Although it is not entirely
certain, it is likely safe to assume that any personal injury claim-including any toxic
tort-that has a reasonablecausalconnection with the attacks will come under the
Southern District's jurisdictional umbrella.
As a result, the mass toxic-tort claims that will likely arise will probably be
consolidated promptly, and the federal judge will apply the choice-of-law rules of
New York to determine which state's substantive law will govern the issues involved
in each claim. Because the court will need to employ only one state's choice-of-law
doctrine,'thisprocedure would undoubtedly make the judge's choice-of-law inquiry
somewhat simpler, thereby easing some of the efficiency problems that would
otherwise plague themass-tort litigation.2" Nevertheless, the court's choice-of-law
inquiry will still be extraordinarily complex for two reasons.1
First, although the Act eliminates the need for the court to identify and apply
numerous states' choice-of-law doctrines,the Act does not eliminate the need for the
court to make a choice-of-law inquiry in itse/ffor each and every claim. Thus, in order
to determine which-states' substantive laws will govern the lawsuits, the court must
still resolve the choice-of-law issues that would inevitably arise in potential
September-I 1-based mass-tort litigation. Because of the Supreme Court's decision in
Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, the trial court may not indiscriminately apply the
substantive law ofa single state-presumablyNewYork-to all the claims;' 7 instead,
the court must make a choice-of-law inquiry for each claim.26 In sum, even though the
Act partially eases the court's choice-of-law task, the court's resolution of these
choice-of-law issues, as discussed above, would still be a very arduous, time-

261. Interim Rule, supra note 251, at 66,276.
262. Id.
263. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, §
408(b)(1), 115 Stat. 230 (2001).
264. Id. § 408(b)(3) (emphasis added).
265. Id. § 408(b)(2) (emphasis added).
266. For a discussion of these inefficiencies, see supra Part I.B.2.i.
267. See supra text accompanying notes 66-71.
268. See supra text accompanying notes 66-71.
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consuming task.2'
Second, New York's choice-of-law doctrine is a particularly complex doctrine to
apply. New York espouses a choice-of-law methodology known as governmental
"interest analysis."27 This governmental interest analysis test mandates that a New
York court apply to a particular issue in a controversy the law of the state with the
greatest interest in fostering its domestic policies on a given issue."' The court must
consider the interests of any state having a significant interest in the particular issue,
including the states of the parties' domiciles and the states in which the conduct and
injury occurred.272 The court determines which state has the greatest interest by
evaluating the facts or contacts of the controversy that relate to the purposes behind
the particular laws in conflict.27 New York courts determine the applicable law on an
issue-by-issue basis; that is, a court must determine what law governs as to each
substantivelaw issue inthe case.27 4 Quite obviously, this issue-by-issue inquiry greatly
increases the complexity of the choice-of-law process. As one treatise explains, this
issue-by-issue resolution of conflicting laws leads to
the potential result that different law[s] on different issues can apply in the
same case. Thus, where the parties have a common domicile of New Jersey,
that law may apply on damages, but if the tort occurred in New York, New
York law could apply on conduct regulating issues (e.g., breach of standard
275
of care).
Other aspects of New York choice-of-law doctrine complicate courts' choice-oflaw inquiries even further. For example, some courts will apply a more concrete set
of choice-of-law rules to determine the applicable law in certain tort cases2 6 These
rules tend to infuse in the government interest analysis doctrine a presumption in
certain instances that the law of the place of the tort or injury should apply. 2"
However, the use "of these rules is not mandatory, as the rules are intended as
"guideposts" for the courts in resolving choice-of-law issues;2 the rules are intended
to supplement, butnot supplant,279 the state's governmental interest analysis choice-oflaw doctrine.2" Unfortunately, the New York Court of Appeals has not clarified
precisely when courts are supposed to use these rules in their choice-of-law

269. See supra text accompanying notes 79-88.
270. Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679, 684 (N.Y. 1985).
271. Id. at 684.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. KREINDLERET AL., supra note 13, § 18.32.
275. Id. § 18.36 n.4.
276. Id. §§ 18.35-.36.
277. Id. § 18.36.
278. Id. §§ 18.36,18.40.
279. Id. § 18.34.
280. Id. § 18.36.
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analyses." Indeed, while some courts have applied these rules rigidly,' others have
ignored them in favor of a pure governmental interest analysis." 3
Hence, the Act's requirement that the federal court apply New York's choice-oflaw doctrine tends to exacerbate the choice-of-law problem that will likely arise in
future September-I 1-based mass-tort litigation. Indeed, New York's choice-of-law
doctrine will require the federal court 1) to identify each state that may be interested
in having its law govern the particular legal issue, 2) to identify the conflicting laws
and their underlying purposes and public policies, 3) to identify the facts and contacts
of the case that make each state interested in having its law applied, and then, taking
all this into account, 4) to determine which state has the greatest interest in having its
law applied to the particular issue in the case. 8' The court must potentially engage in
this elaborate process not only for each plaintiff, but also for each issue in each
plaintiff's case that presents a conflict between the laws of two or more interested
states. 5 In addition, the current uncertainty regarding the applicability of more
concrete choice-of-law rules in tort cases makes the problem even worse.
In the end, with respect to future September-1 1-based mass-tort litigation, the
choice-of-law process that the Act effectively establishes falls short for three reasons:
efficiency concerns, equity concerns, and federalism concerns.
First,the choice-of-law process that the Act establishes is inefficient. As discussed
above, the Southern District of New York will not have to identify and apply the
choice-of-law provisions of numerous jurisdictions; rather, it will only need to apply
New York choice-of-law doctrine.2" Nevertheless, the court may still need to make
individual choice-of-law inquiries for thousands of plaintiffs to determine which
states' substantive laws will govern the various issues involved in each plaintiff's
claim. Because New York's choice-of-law doctrine is particularly complex,287 the
court's inquiries will be even more difficult. As a result, while the court's choice-oflaw task is certainly lessened, the court must still expend substantial resources to
determine the substantive law to which the New York choice-of-law doctrine points
with respect to each issue in each plaintiff's case. With the court potentially forced
to make these determinations for tens of thousands of plaintiffs from all over the
nation and the world, the process will inevitably be extremely inefficient.288 This
would undoubtedly increase the cost and duration of the litigation." 9 In addition,
delays in determining the applicable substantive law could interfere with effective
settlement negotiations.2"°

281. Id.
282. Id.; see, e.g., Barkanic v. Gen. Admin. of Civil Aviation of the People's Republic of
China, 923 F.2d 957, 962-63 (2d Cir. 1991).
283. KREINDLER ET AL., supra note 13, § 18.36; see, e.g., Curley v. American Airlines,
846 F. Supp. 280, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
284. See supra text accompanying notes 271-75.
285. KREINDLER ET AL, supra note 13, § 18.32.
286. See supra text accompanying notes 266-69.
287. See supra text accompanying notes 270-83.
288. See supra Part I.B.2.i.
289. Mullenix, supra note 17, at 1076.
290. Id.
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Second, the choice-of-law process may lead to unfair results. If the court's choiceof-law inquiry requires that different substantive laws be applied to different plaintiffs'
claims, the court may be unable to adjudicate similar cases collectively. For example,
if a group of plaintiffs wished to file claims together as a class, the class might not
meet Rule 23's requirements ofcommonality, predominance, and manageability"' if
the court, after conducting a choice-of-law inquiry for each member of the class, were
required to apply numerous states' substantive laws.2" To the extent that these choiceof-law problems impair collective adjudication of similar claims, this fosters
duplicative litigation and creates the risk that similarly situated plaintiffs who are
forced to litigate separately might experience unfairly disparate legal outcomes or
recoveries. 293 To be sure, Congress and the Justice Department were concerned about
minimizing these disparities with respect to the Fund,294 so it is likely that they were
also concerned about minimizing these disparities in any September-i 1-based
litigation under the Act. As the Justice Department stated in announcing the Act's
regulations, the Department wanted to create a program that would "treat similarly
situated claimants alike."295 Finally, the choice-of-law process may unfairly impose
on the defendants legal standards that they could nothave foreseen, thereby frustrating
party expectations."
Third, the choice-of-law process created by the Act seems to be ideologically
inconsistent with the spirit of the Act itself. It is curious that Congress, although
presumably motivated to pass the Act because of the uniquely nationalnature of the
terrorist attacks, 297 chose to respond by directing federal courts to applystatetort law.
Commenting on this exact type of situation, Professor Kramer noted that it is ironic
to establish a "choice-of-law rule that selects the [substantive] law of a single state on
the ground that... litigation is national in character. I would have thought that the
more 'national' the case, the less appropriate it is for any single state's standard to
govern." 2"' Professor Friedrich Juenger drives the point home: "In situations... that
so clearly transcendstate and even nationalboundaries,there are no good reasons
for leaving the parties' rights and obligations to the vagaries of state laws."'2 The
reality of the aftermath of September I1 is a national issue of the foremost degree.
The litigation that will likely ensue from the consequences of the terrorist attacks,
including any toxic-tort litigation, will be so "national in character" and will "so
clearly transcend state and international boundaries" that application of state law is

291. FED. R. Civ. P. 23; see also supratext accompanying notes 102-14.
292. Torchiana, supranote 67, at 915.
293. See supra Part I.B.2.ii.
294. Interim Rule, supranote 251, at 66,275.
295. Id.
296. See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
297. The Justice Department commented that the Fund "is an attempt by the American
people [through Congress] to demonstrate their solidarity with, and generosity for, those
injured by the terrible September 1 attack on our country." Interim Rule, supranote 251, at
66,275.
298. Kramer, supra note 47, at 578 (emphasis in original).
299. Friedrich K.Juenger, The Complex LitigationProject'sTort Choice-of-Law Rules,
54 LA. L. REv. 907,922-23 (1994) (emphasis added).
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inappropriate. Indeed, the litigation requires a truly national solution-federal
substantive law.
In summary, the choice-of-law inquiries that the federal court would need to make
in any future September-I 1-based mass toxic torts would be complex and timeconsuming due to 1) the extraordinary number and geographical dispersal of the
potential plaintiffs, and 2) the complexity of New York's choice-of-law doctrine.
Because the court's resolution of choice-of-law issues would be such a complicated
task, the process will likely be inefficient and inequitable. In addition, the fact that the
court must apply state substantive law to such nationalissues is perplexing.
III. REFORMING CHOICE OF LAW IN SEPTEMBER- 1I-BASED MASS Toxic TORTS
THROUGH FEDERAL SUBSTANTIVE TORT LAW

As discussed above, the choice-of-law process that the Act creates for handling
potential mass-tort litigation isproblematic for a number of reasons.3" To solve the
choice-of-law problems inherent in this type of litigation, scholars have suggested a
variety of reforms. One such reform would entirely eliminate the choice-of-law
problem through congressional creation of a body of federal substantive-tort law.30'
Although some scholars have dismissed the creation of federal substantive tort law as
being politically infeasible or inappropriate,Z recent events have made it both
feasible and appropriate for the federal government to establish a limited body of
substantive tort law to help manage potential September- 1-based mass toxic-tort
litigation. This Part begins by discussing in general terms the reformation of the masstort choice-of-law process through federal substantive tort law. Then, this Part
discusses this reform as applied to September-11-based mass toxic-tort litigation.
Finally, this Part concludes that Congress should strongly consider enacting
incremental substantive tort law to manage September-I 1-based mass toxic torts.
A. Using FederalSubstantive Tort Law to
Reform Mass-TortChoice ofLaw Generally
Because of the myriad difficulties that choice-of-law issues present in mass-tort
litigation, 3 many scholars have suggested that the federal government intervene" to
help bring order to the "chaos"305 and "drain the dismal swamp" of the choice-of-law
realm.3" Commentators who advocate for greater and more effective consolidation of
mass-tort litigation are virtually unanimous in arguing that federal intervention is

300. See supraPart II.B.
301. See, e.g., Juenger, supranote 299, at 921.
302. See infra text accompanying notes 342-50.
303. See supraPart I.B.2.
304. See, e.g., Gottesman, supra note 8; Reavley & Wesevich, supranote 50.
305. Kastenmeier & Geyh, supra note.72, at 541.
306. See Gottesman, supra note 8, at 1 (playing off of William Prosser's colorful
description of the "realm of the conflicts of laws [as] a dismal swamp," William L. Prosser,
Interstate Publication,51 MICH. L. REV. 959, 971 (1953)).
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necessary? 0 7As noted previously, federal diversity courts have become the "forums
of choice" for mass-tort litigants.3 °8 To a great extent, therefore, because mass-tort
litigation has become "de facto federalized," the relevant question is no longer,
"Should mass-tort litigation be federalized?" but rather, "How should current and
future federal cases be resolved more effectivelyT 3° Even the most vocal critics of
the majority view 3" ° admit that in some circumstances, federal intervention would be
helpful and appropriate.3 ' Although much of the literature has focused on the need
for a uniform federal choice-of-law rule for mass torts,-there has been support for the
creation offederal substantivemass-tortlaw.3" Because Part ILI.B of this Note argues
that adoption of a limited body of federal substantive tort law is necessary, feasible,
and appropriate to help manage September-11-based mass toxic torts, this Note
focuses on substantive tort law as a reform option.313
Scholars have offered numerous justifications for the federalization of mass-tort

307. Kastenmeier & Geyh, supra note 72, at 565. Interestingly, Professor Michael
Gottesman noted that "many of the prominent architects of the 'modem' [choice-of-law]
theories now predominating under state law believed that there should be a uniform federal rule
applied throughout the nation to determine choice of law disputes." Gottesman, supranote 8,
at 19.
308. Mullenix, supra note 15, at 786; see also Bird, supra note 59, at 1093 (footnote
omitted) ("[Tihe usefulness and availability of procedural devices created by federal law have
led litigants to rely almost exclusively upon federal courts for the adjudication of mass tort
claims.").
309. Mullenix, supra note 15, at 786-87.
310. See supra text accompanying notes 116, 145.
311. See Sedler & Twerski, Sacrifice Without Gain, supra note 116, at 106-07 (stating
that in the truly unmanageable mass torts-for example, asbestos and Agent' Orange
litigation-only direct federalization of the cause of action itself would address the problem).
312. Most of the scholars who advocate for a federal choice-of-law rule for mass torts
admit that creation of federal substantive law covering mass torts (for example, airplane
crashes, toxic exposure cases, and so on) would ideally be the best solution. See, e.g., Juenger,
supranote 299, at 921. Indeed, federalizing the causeofaction itselfwould eliminate the need
for choice-of-law analyses altogether. Id.
313. Another reform option that some scholars have suggested relies on the federal
judiciary to create substantive tort law. See, e.g., Georgene M. Vairo, Multi-Tort Cases: Cause
for More Darknesson the Subject, or a New Rolefor FederalCommon Law?, 54 FORDHAM
L. REV.167, 182-200 (1985). These scholars have argued that federal courts, on theirown (that
is, without substantive federal legislation), possess the authority to create a body of federal
mass-tort law via federal common law. See id.; see also Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P.
Miller, A Market Approach to Tort Reform Via Rule 23, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 909, 910-11
(1995); Aaron D. Twerski, With Liberty andJusticeforAll: An Essay on Agent Orangeand
Choice of Law, 52 BROOK. L. REv. 341,366-67 (1986). Twerski stated:
The only way [to decide the Agent Orange case appropriately] was to create a national
rule ... based... on what the court believed to be the preferable national solution to the

problem.... In short, the only way to resolve the conflicts problems in this case was to
create a federal common law.
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law either through choice-of-law or substantive rules." 4 First, establishing a uniform
rule would eliminate many of the efficiency problems discussed in Part I.B.2.i and
would thereby reduce the cost, complexity, and duration ofthe litigation. For example,
a federal rule would be more efficient because it would undoubtedly be easier to apply
than the present system, which requires courts to employ states' choice-of-law
doctrines to determine the applicable substantive law." 5 Indeed, a federal substantive
rule would eliminate the need to make choice-of-law inquiries altogether; instead of
looking to state law for the applicable substantive rules, the court would merely apply
the federal substantive rule to the entire litigation. Courts would no longer need to
expend substantial resources resolving preliminary choice-of-law issues, but rather
would be able to concentrate inmiediately on the merits of the case. In addition,
because the court would no longer have to deal with choice-of-law problems that
create uncertainty regarding the applicable substantive law, the parties to the litigation
could more promptly and effectively negotiate settlements. 6
A federal substantive rule would also relieve court congestion by significantly
reducing wastefully duplicative litigation of claims"' arising from the same mass
tort.3 18 For example, because courts across the nation would uniformly apply the same
federal substantive rule, the current incentive for plaintiffs to forum-shop" 9 would be
reduced or eliminated. Additionally, a uniform rule would permit more effective
consolidation of these cases320 because the current procedural barriers to maintaining
mass-tort class actions 321 would no longer inhibit the collective adjudication of masstort claims. Indeed, because the same substantive law would apply to all claims
stemming from a particular mass tort, the three requirements of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23--commonality of questions of law or fact, predominance of these
common questions, and manageability of the class action -would usually be met.
Second, a federal rule would arguably be more equitable. For example, a federal
substantive rule would reduce the inequity of the current system by eliminating the
risk ofinconsistent and disparate legal outcomes inherent in the independent litigation
of substantially similar claims.3' Because a federal rule would ensure that the same
legal standards would be applied to all similar claims-regardless of where the

314. See, e.g., Kane, supra note 77, at 313-14.
315. Reavley & Wesevich, supra note 50, at 30. Professor Kane notes that under a
uniform rule, federal courts could more effectively manage complex litigation because they
would no longer have to "engage in an extremely complicated [choice-of-law] inquiry." Kane,
supra note 77, at 313-14.
316. See supratext accompanying notes 86-87.
317. See Kane, supra note 77, at 313-14.
318. See Kastenmeier & Geyh, supranote 72, at 543-51.
319. See supra text accompanying notes 93-95.
320. Reavley & Wesevich, supra note 50, at 31.
321. See supra text accompanying notes 100-115.
322. See supra text accompanying notes 102-104.
323. See, e.g., Reavley & Wesevich, supra note 50, at 22-30 (arguing that a federal rule
would promote fairness by ensuring uniformity of legal outcomes, by establishing neutrality
through a reduction in the incentive to forum-shop, and by creating determinacy in the
interpretation of choice-of-law rules).
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plaintiffs brought them-the federal rule would improve the overall consistency of
legal outcomes. In addition, a federal substantive rule would be more equitable to
mass-tort defendants because they could depend on the consistent application of a
uniform standard of conduct.32
Third, establishing a federal rule would further the federal interests implicated in
mass-tort actions. 32 Mass-tort litigation has significant interstate effects, not only
because of the number and geographical diversity of the people affected by the tort,
but also because of the interstate activity of typical mass-tort defendants. 3" Scholars
have argued that a uniform federal rule is necessary because products liability and
toxic-tort cases frequently have "multistate implications." 27 Congress's decision to
regulate a variety ofproducts and substances that are the frequent subjects ofproducts
liability and toxic-tort litigation reinforces this argument: "a conflict among the
interests of numerous states concerning the [toxic] product or substance presents an
intrinsically federal problem.
,o2.Additionally, one scholar bluntly opines that in
situations like mass toxic torts "that so clearly transcend state... boundaries, there
are no good reasons for leaving the parties' rights and obligations to the vagaries of
state law."329 Therefore, "parochial, self-serving" state doctrines are unacceptable330
given that the federal interest involved in a mass tort "certainly outweighs the interest
of any individual state."331
Nevertheless, some scholars, while recognizing the potential benefits of
establishing a uniform federal rule, urge restraint. To begin with, they note that before
Congress may establish federal mass-tort rules, it should, as a threshold matter,
confirm that it has the authority and institutional competence to federalize the law.332
In most mass-tort situations, however, this threshold concern is a nonissue as a
practical matter. Indeed, because the vast majority of mass-tort litigation has an
undeniable effect on interstate commerce, Congress, as the elected representatives of
the Americanpeople, undoubtedlyhas the power and competence to displace state law

324. See supratext accompanying notes 137-40.
325. As Professor Weinberg notes, there is a national interest not only in ensuring
"effective administration of mass [tort] litigation," but also in the mass torts themselves. Louise
Weinberg, Mass Torts atthe NeutralForum:A CriticalAnalysisoftheALI"sProposedChoice
Rule, 56 ALB. L. REV. 807, 817-18 (1993).
326. Atwood, supra note 5, at 15; see also Bird, supra note 59, at 1093 ("[M]ost mass
torts arise from interstate economic activity and directly affect citizens from many states.");
Reavley & Wesevich, supra note 50, at 22 ("[Ihe number of parties, combined with the
amount of money at stake in... mass-tort cases gives these cases a uniquely national
dimension.").
327. Gottesman, supra note 8, at 16.
328. Vairo, supra note 313, at 198. "The myriad federal statutes regulating various
hazardous products and substances... provide authority for a federal court to create a federal
rule when competing state interests and identifiable federal interests are presented." Id. at 203.
329. Juenger, supra note 299, at 922-23.
330. Donald T. Trautman, Toward FederalizingChoice ofLaw, 70 TEx. L REv. 1715,
1734 (1992).
331. Tobin, supra note 137, at 482.
332. See, e.g., Sedler & Twerski, Sacrifice Without Gain, supra note 116, at 83-90.
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by legislating substantive mass-tort law.333
In urging restraint, these scholars also stress federalism concerns by noting that
state governments arguably have legitimate interests in having their substantive tort
law applied in mass-tort litigation.334 According to these scholars, the federal
government should displace state law only in limited circumstances in which Congress
concludes that a case "with interstate or international ramifications [will] impose an
'undue burden' on interstate commerce."33 Professor Sedler has commented that
creation of a federal substantive rule would encroach on states' sovereignty in two
ways.336 First, a federal rule would deprive states of their power to establish
substantive rules regulating disputes betweenparties in mass-tort litigation.337 Second,
a federal rule would "require that the states sacrifice the strong policies underlying
their substantive tort laws by denying the application of a state's law in cases where
the state would have a real interest in implementing its policy."33

333. Id. at 83; see also Juenger, supra note 299, at 921 ("That the Congress has the power
to adopt such rules is of course beyond cavil .... ").
334. Robert A. Sedler, Interest Analysis, State Sovereignty, and Federally-Mandated
Choice of Law in "Mass Tort "Cases, 56 ALB. L. REv. 855, 870-79 (1993).
335. Sedler & Twerski, Sacrifice Without Gain, supra note 116, at 86 (emphasis added).
Professor Sedler notes:
While Congress has the power to override or displace state law, as a matter of
federal supremacy, Congress has recognized that any exercise offederal power
should be undertaken with due regard for the traditional sovereignty of the
states and their role in the federal system .... Congress has long recognized
this fundamental principle of our federal system ....

Congress has been

unwilling to use its power over interstate commerce to enact federal
substantive law, such as national products liability law, that would displace
state law applicable to the resolution ofdisputes between private persons, even
though these disputes may significantly affect interstate commerce ....
Congress then has been extremely solicitous of the primary responsibility of
the states in our federal system which is to promulgate the law applicable to
disputes between private persons and to adjudicate such disputes in their
courts.
Sedler, supra note 334, at 874-75.
336. Sedler, supra note 334, at 873.
337. Id.
338. Id. Other scholars counter this argument from a number of different fronts. Professor
Kane argues: "The judicial efficiency to be gained by allowing the application of a single...
standard in a consolidation court, as well as the ability to promote similar results for similar
cases, seem to outweigh the intrusion into a sphere traditionally dominated by the states."
Kane, supra note 77, at 314. Reavley and Wesevich state:
[T]hese critics grossly overstate the states' interests in perpetuating the present
system.... First, as a practical matter in all multistate cases, the plaintiffs and
the states share control over which state's law governs the controversy
[because the plaintiff is able to forum-shop].... Second, states' inattention to
choice-of-law issues [as indicated by the almost universal failure of state
legislatures to enact choice-of-law statutes] reflects their lack of practical
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Conceivably, these federalism concerns may help explain why Congress has
generally chosen not to tackle choice-of-law issues in mass-tort litigation. Without a
doubt, Congress could solve the choice-of-law problem "in one fell swoop" by simply
enacting federal substantive mass-tort law. 39 However, despite a handful of ill-fated
attempts to address the mass-tort problem, Congress has failed to intervene. 4 ° In
addition, with a few notable exceptions,"' scholars and legal reform organizations,
though praising the potential benefits of federal substantive mass-tort law, 42 generally
consider it an unrealistic reform solution. 3
Scholars note that congressional enactment of substantive law is ordinarily an
unrealistic option because of Congress's traditional respect for state sovereignty. 3"
Indeed, Congress has shown great deference to the states in the area of tort law.3" One
scholar argues that it would be an "extraordinary departure" from this historic
deference for Congress to solve choice-of-law problems by enacting substantive tort
law. 46 "[T]hat Congress has the power to federalize does not mean that its power
should be exercised .... This is a matter of policy choice .... [Some scholars]
strongly oppose such a choice."" For example, Professors Sedler and Twerski argue
that because of this respect for state sovereignty, Congress should only consider
adopting substantive tort law when it can "demonstrate an overriding necessity" for

ability to affect choice-of-law decisions.... Finally, there is even ample
precedent for federal preemption of areas of state law in which states' interest
are appropriately characterized as traditional, active, and significant.
Reavley & Wesevich, supra note 50, at 19-21.
339. Mullenix, supra note 9, at 1631-32; see also Juenger, supra note 299, at 920-21
("[lI]t can hardly be denied that equal justice in mass [tort] cases would be considerably
enhanced by a uniform body of federal law.").
340. See Mullenix, supra note 9, at 1628; see also Mullenix, supranote 17, at 1078 n.203.
Professor Kramer muses: "Congress has declined to legislate--whether from lack of political
will, the urge to toady to palm-greasing lobbyists, or wisdom in recognizing the benefits of
leaving states a role." Kramer, supra note 47, at 550.
341. See Pamela M. Madas, To Settlement Classes andBeyond: A Primeron Proposed
MethodsforFederalizingMass Tort Litigation,28 SETON HALL L. REV. 540, 562-68 (1997)
(proposing that substantive mass-tort law could be established either through the judiciary or
through an act of Congress"); see also Mullenix, supra note 15, at 779-91.
342. See, e.g., Russell J. Weintraub, Methodsfor Resolving Conflict-of-Laws Problems
in Mass Tort Litigation, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 129, 141 nn.72-73.
343. See Madas, supra note 341, at 567; see also Mullenix, supra note 9, at 1632.
("[N]one of the major institutional law reform organizations... have ever seriously even
mentioned the possibility of substantive mass-tort legislation."); Symeonides, supranote 34,
at 855 (noting that reform via substantive tort law is generally regarded as "utopian").
344. See Sedler, supra note 3, at 1088.
345. Gottesman, supra note 8, at 30 (describing tort law as an area that has "traditionally
been left to state control").
346. Id.
347. Symeonides, supra note 34, at 852 (emphasis in original); see also Sedler &Twerski,
Sacrifice Without Gain, supra note 116, at 83 ("[Tlhe measure of Congress' constitutional
power is not the measure ofaproperexercise of that power.") (emphasis in original).
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a federal solution to justify "such a radical subversion of state sovereignty."34 As a
general rule, scholars like Sedler and Twerski believe that the problems inherent in
"garden-variety" mass-tort litigation do not warrant federal substantive tort law.349
Many scholars disagree with this assessment. For example, although Professor
Linda Mullenix admits that mass-tort litigation may not present a compelling case for
federalization by some traditional analyses, she nevertheless argues that the unique
characteristics and problems of mass-tort cases justify enactment of substantive masstort law legislation, presumably regardless of state sovereignty issues.35 She argues
that mass-tort litigation is a "peculiar litigation phenomenon which transforms the
simple state tort into something conceptually different. This difference supports the
need for federalization."35 ' Indeed, even Professors Sedler and Twerski admit that
enactment of federal substantive tort law will occasionally be justified:
We do not argue that it is improper in all circumstances for Congress to
modify state law applicable to [mass-tort cases]. In certain limited
circumstances, Congress may conclude that national interests require
displacement of state law, and that diverse or cumulative imposition of
liability in cases with interstate or internationalramifications impose an
"undue burden" on interstatecommerce... Where Congress legislates by

creating substantive law to resolve a problem of national significance, it
presumably has done so after having weighed the merits of the issue, and
chosen a national solution to it.... [In] the true mega-mass disastercases...
there is no alternative to directlyfederalizing the cause of action and

fashioning special rules that will address both the procedural and substantive
3 52
law problems which are indigenous to them.
Most scholars concede that in the inmediate future, Congress is not likely to enact
substantive tort law that would cover thefull gamut of mass-tort litigation, or even a

348. Sedler & Twerski, Sacrifice Without Gain, supra note 116, at 85. Reavley and
Wesevich state that Congress, if it decides to act at all, will generally opt for the action that
intrudes the least on state sovereignty and tort law. Reavley & Wesevich, supranote 50, at 35
("[A]ithough federal substantive law could facilitate fairness and efficiency in the resolution
of... mass-tort cases, Congress will not reach this option as long as it recognizes others that
are less intrusive and easier to implement.").
349. See Sedler & Twerski, Sacrifice Without Gain, supra note 116, at 85-86.
350. Mullenix, supra note 15, at 763-72 (noting that mass-tort litigation seems to be an
"uncompelling candidate for federalization" when viewed through the lens of the Federal
Judicial Center's framework to decide whether an area of the law should be federalized).
351. Id. at 782 (pointing to difficulties with procedural consolidation and complex issues
in ascertaining applicable substantive law as two reasons for this "transformation"). Professor
Mullenix then offers several alternative justifications for federalization. First, mass-tort
litigation has already been de facto federalized. Id. at 786-87; see alsotext accompanying notes
40, 307-08. Second, "existing procedural rules and doctrine have proved significantly
ineffective to resolve aggregate mass tort litigation." Mullenix, supra note 15, at 787-88.
352. Sedler & Twerski, Sacrifice Without Gain, supra note 116, at 86-87, 106-07
(emphasis added).
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significant portion thereof.3" 3 However, some scholars believe that incremental
federalization of certain key "problem areas" such as products liability litigation is
currently politically feasible." For example, Congress has arguably "already taken
steps toward nationalizing products liability law," and at least one scholar urges
Congress to "continue these steps and develop a workable solution to mass tort
litigation."3 In fact, Congress has enacted nearly a dozen incremental federal tort
reform laws over the past several years.3 6 Although not dealing directly with mass-tort
issues, these laws demonstrate that Congress is becoming "more and more
accustomed" to enacting incremental tort reform legislation that preempts state tort
law." Arguably, the incremental tort reform trend is gaining steam, for "the
proponents of... incremental tort reforms are able to hold them up as examples to
help get the next [tort reform passed], or to save one that might be challenged in
court."3 "2 In light of this trend, the possibility of Congress enacting incremental
substantive mass-tort reforms no longer seems unrealistic and politically infeasible.
Some scholars have suggested another mode of congressional intervention. In
theory, Congress could federalize a particular mass-tort cause of action without
explicitly defining the substantive standards to be applied by the courts, thereby
leaving itup to the federal judiciary to flesh out the substantive law359 via creation of

353. See, e.g., Madas, supra note 341, at 567.
354. See, e.g., id. at 562-68; Trautman, supra note 330, at 1730-41.
355. Madas, supra note 341, at 567.
356. Terry Carter, Piecemeal Tort Reform, A.B.A. J., Dec. 2001, at 50, 53; see, e.g.,
Aviation Disaster Family Assistance Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-264, § 702, 110 Stat. 3213,
3265 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1136 (Supp. V 1999)) (preventing lawyers and insurance
companies from contacting airplane crash survivors orfamilies of crash victims for thirty days);
Bill Emerson Good Samaritan Food Donation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-210, 110 Stat.
3011 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1791 (Supp. V 1999)) (limiting liability for lawsuits and criminal
prosecutions of people and corporations donating food to the needy); Amtrak Reform and
Accountability Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-134, § 161, 111 Stat. 2570,2577 (codified at 49
U.S.C. § 28,103 (Supp. V 1999)) (setting a $200 million limit for damages in a single rail
accident and requiring evidence of flagrant indifference to the safety of injured parties in order
to recover punitive damages); Biomaterials Access Assurance Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105230, 112 Stat. 1519 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 1604 (Supp. V 1999)) (relieving suppliers of raw
materials or components for medical devices from liability unless they failed to meet product
specifications); Year 2000 Information and Readiness Disclosure Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-271, 112 Stat. 2386 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6612 (Supp. V 1999)) (limiting liability in
civil suits stemming from Year 2000 computer failures).
357. Carter, supra note 356, at 52.
358. Id.
359. See, e.g., Atwood, supra note 5, at 25 ("Congress on rare occasion has provided
federal jurisdiction over a type of controversy without establishing substantive standards to be
applied by the courts."); see also Juenger, supra note 299, at 921 (stating that it is within the
power of Congress to enact a statute empowering federal courts to create substantive rules on
their own); P. John Kozyris, The ConflictsProvisionsofthe ALIs Complex LitigationProject:
A Glass HalfFull?, 54 LA.L. REv. 953, 955 (1994) (stating that Congress could solve the
"choice-of-law dilemma by dumping the problem on the lap of the federal courts called upon
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federal common law.3 " While a few scholars have viewed this possible approach
favorably,3"' most scholars criticize it for two reasons. First, the choices that the courts
would have to make to develop the substantive law "are so complex and laden with
'
policy choices" that the process is "ideally suited for the legislative process."362
Second, a "long period of uncertainty" would result while the federal courts struggled
to define the substantive law on a circuit-by-circuit basis, waiting for Supreme Court
guidance that might never arrive." As a result, if Congress decides to enact
substantive mass-tort legislation, it should probably include explicit substantive
standards for the courts to apply and interpret. It should not put the fundamental
lawmaking process in the hands of the judiciary.
B. Applying the Reform to September-]l -BasedMass Toxic Torts
It is likely that the American public will not tolerate September-1 1-based litigation
that deteriorates into the type of contentious and drawn-out debacle that often occurs
in high-profile mass-tort litigation. Unfortunately, however, the current system is not
likely to prevent this from happening. As discussed in Part II.B., the choice-of-law

to create new types of common law"); Rubin, supralhote 19, at 444 ("Congress ... has the
power to give the courts a mandate to develop... a uniform [substantive] rule.").
360. Federal common law is the body of decisional law developed by the federal judiciary
that derives its authority from the federal courts' judgments and decrees. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 60 (6th ed. 1990). "The application of this body of common law is limited by the
Erie doctrine and by the Rules of Decision Act, which provides that except for cases governed
by the Constitution,the treaties of the United States, or acts of Congress,federal courts are to
apply state law." Id. (emphasis added). As a result, when a federal court has jurisdiction over
a case solely based on diversity of citizenship--a situation that includes, as discussed above,
the vast majority of mass toxic-tort cases, see supra text accompanying notes 14-15-the
federal court must apply and interpret the state law as it thinks the highest state court would
do. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,78 (1938).
361. See Juenger, supra note 299, at 921-22 (stating that it would be sensible to entrust
the task of formulating substantive rules to the federal courts-as opposed to
Congress-because federal judges "can rely on a fully formed body of case law, including...
products liability rules"); see also Rubin, supra note 19, at 444 (arguing that federal courts,
"[i]f given the duty and the power to apply a uniform product liability law," could apply, for
example, the principles embodied in the Restatement (Second) of Torts).
362. Kozryis, supra note 359, at 955.
363. Id. As the Fifth Circuit explained in the context of asbestos litigation:
First, any decision by this court to displace state law would be effective only
within our geographical jurisdiction. While it is of course possible that other
circuits would in time follow our lead, [this is not guaranteed.] Unless and
until the Supreme Court imposes a similar federal common law on the country
as a whole, any federal substantive rules fashioned by us would exacerbate the
alleged inequities among claimants . . . . Such a result, in turn, would
encourage a massive effort at forum-shopping ....
Mullenix, supra note 17, at 1079 n.204 (quoting Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
750 F.2d 1314, 1326 (5th Cir. 1985)).
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procedures that the Act establishes for handling eventual September-i 1-based masstort litigation will arguably be inefficient, unfair, and inappropriate? Not only will
the legitimate interests ofpotentially injured parties be put at risk by the inefficiency
and inequity of the Act's procedures, but the Act's procedures will also tend to ignore
the national interests likely to be involved in the eventual litigation. Indeed, it is
difficult to imagine litigation that would implicate national interests more than
September-I -based mass torts, because these cases will stem from the consequences
of terrorist acts that were intended to be attacks on our nation as a whole. Perhaps
recognizing this, Congress and the Justice Department highlighted these important
national interests in the Act and its regulations.365
To help remedy the Act's choice-of-law problems, Congress should streamline and
simplify the eventual toxic-tort litigation as much as possible. To date, Congress has
already taken helpful steps to make the litigation more manageable. 3' However,
Congress should finish the task by enacting legislation that establishes substantive tort
law standards to deal with the major legal and factual issues destined to arise in the
upcoming toxic-tort litigation. Indeed, establishing a limited body of substantive tort
law would likely rectify efficiency and equity problems, preserve the strong national
interests likely to be involved in the future litigation, and help prevent a publicopinion backlash against those whom the public perceives to be profiting from a
national tragedy.
First, establishing substantive tort law standards would make the litigation more
efficient and fair. For example, if Congress were to adopt substantive standards, the
Southern District ofNew York would then have a singular body of tort law with which
to decide cases, thereby eliminating the need for time-consuming choice-of-law
inquiries.3" In addition, a uniform standard would promote equity by ensuring that the
same conduct and liability standards would apply to all similarly situated plaintiffs.
Currently, the Act fails to ensure fair results because it directs the Southern District
to apply New Y6rk choice-of-law rules and, by extension, a variety of different
substantive tort laws. If Congress were to include legislative measures to ensure that
damage awards were distributed meritoriously and promptly, it could promote equity
even further.
Second, substantive standards would protect the unique national interests involved
in the litigation. Congress passed the Act for at least two reasons: to minimize damage
to the national economy due to business failures caused by crushing liability, and to
ensure that victims would receive fair and prompt compensation. Effectively,
Congress determined that the national interest required the nation to accept collective
responsibility for compensating victims and protecting business sectors vital to the
nation's economy. As the Justice Department stated, the Act and the Fund are "an

364. See supraPart II.B.
365. See Interim Rule, supra note 251, at 66,275.
366. For example, as noted earlier, the Act ensures consolidation of lawsuits in the
Southern District of New York. See supratext accompanying notes 264-65.
367. Of course, a body of substantive tort law covering toxic exposure claims would help
simplify litigation beyond merely eliminating choice-of-law problems. For example, Congress
could address other toxic-tort "problem areas" such as causation and indeterminate defendant
issues.
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attempt by the American people to demonstrate their solidarity with, and generosity
for, those injured by the. . attack on our country."" In light of this, it is perplexing
that Congress would declare the matter to be of such paramount national importance
that the nation must take collective financial responsibility for it, yet declare that
undoubtedly myopic state law-in the sense that it does not consider national
concerns-will serve as the applicable substantive law. It is likely that the eventual
toxic-tort litigation-or any September 11-based litigation, for that matter-will
probablyproduce an impact on interstate commerce and the national economy that no
other litigation in our nation'shistory has produced.Indeed, the estimated potential
liability for asbestos contaminationalone is $8 billion to $20 billion." 9 To leave such
crucial and weighty national matters to the arguable "vagaries of state law" is
potentially unwise. Congress can, and should, protect these national interests by
enacting substantive law that reflects these concerns and takes state substantive tort
law out of the picture.
Third, uniform substantive standards that simplify and streamline the litigation
process would help contain the outrage that many Americans would feel if and when
the litigation balloons out of control. Despite the fact that the Act's Fund will funnel
a certain number of claims away from litigation and into the Fund, there will likely
still be an extraordinary amount of litigation. Indeed, as discussed previously, the vast
majority ofpotential plaintiffs claiming injury due to exposure to toxic substances will
not be eligible for the Fund and will therefore need to litigate to recover at all.370 This
morass of litigation will undoubtedly fare poorly in the court of public opinion once
the litigation deteriorates into a shoving match with attorneys elbowing each other to
dig into the defendants' deep pockets. '
In arguing that Congress should enact substantive tort law to simplify September11-based litigation, it is useful to evaluate the argument through the lens of scholars'
commentary on the viability and propriety of enacting federal substantive tort law.
While some scholars urge restraint in the use of federal substantive tort law due to
federalism concerns, practically all agree that certain circumstances warrant its
development.37 However, most scholars feel that development of substantive tort law
is, as a general matter, politically unrealistic. 3"
Professors Sedler and Twerski, the foremost opponents of federalizing substantive
tort law, themselves admit that Congress may appropriately adopt substantive tort law
when it can "demonstrate an overriding necessity" for a federal solution.37 3
In certain limited circumstances, Congress may conclude that national
interests requiredisplacement of state law, and that diverse or cumulative
imposition of liabilityin cases with interstateor internationalramifications
impose an "undue burden" on interstate commerce.... Where Congress
legislates by creating substantive law to resolve a problem of national

368. Interim Rule, supra note 251, at 66,275.
369. Updegrave, supra note 212.
370. See supratext accompanying notes 260-63.
371. See supraPart III.A.
372. See supraPart III.A.
373. See supratext accompanying note 348.
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significance,it presumably has done so after having weighed the merits of the
issue, and chosen a national solution to it .... [In] the true mega-mass
disastercases... there is no alternative to directlyfederalizingthe cause of
action andfashioningspecialrulesthat will addressboth3 the
proceduraland
74
substantive law problems which are indigenous to them.
September-11-based mass-tort litigation appears to be one of these "limited
circumstances." If even the harshest critics offederal substantive tort law concede that
its development would be appropriate to deal with September-11-based mass-tort
litigation, then the only remaining question is whether its development is politically
feasible..
Scholars have argued that incrementalfederalization of substantive mass-tort law
is currently a realistic option, and Congress has recently demonstrated a willingness
to preempt state tort law via incremental substantive tort reforms."' If Congress were
to enact substantive tort law to cover certain aspects of September-l1-based
litigation-for example, subsequent toxic torts-this would indeed be incremental in
nature, thereby making the option more politically feasible. In addition, the political
climate has undoubtedly changed in Congress since September 11, and it is reasonable
to assume that Congress would be even more willing to preempt state tort law in a
time ofcrisis. Indeed, Congress has alreadyenactedsubstantivetortlaw with respect
to September-1 I-based claims by not only declaring that the Fund "shall not consider
negligence or any other theory of liability"3 6 in evaluating claims, but also by
charging the Justice Department with the task of promulgating substantive and
procedural regulations to implement the Fund.3n Indeed, it can no longer be said that
congressional federalization-especially incremental federalization--of substantive
tort law is unrealistic and politically infeasible.
Thus, Congress should implement one of two options: 1) Congress should enact
substantive tort law that would cover the future September-i 1-based toxic-tort
litigation or,perhaps ideally, 2) Congress should amend the Act to bring future toxictort plaintiffs under the control of the Fund and direct the Justice Department to
promulgate regulations creating substantive and procedural standards by which to
evaluate and administratively adjudicate the toxic-tort claims. As the Justice
Department stated, "Congress might later consider whether an administrative program
for latent harm caused by the September 11, 2001, terrorist-related aircraft crashes
may be appropriate."37 Congress should strongly consider doing so.
In sum, although the Act partially reduces the burden of the choice-of-law issues
that will plague the seemingly inevitable September-i1-based mass toxic-tort
litigation, choice-of-law issues still threaten to make, the future litigation
unmanageable, inefficient, and unfair. Congress should solve these

374. Sedler & Twerski, Sacrifice Without Gain, supra note 116, at 86-87, 106-07
(emphasis added).
375. See supra text accompanying notes 354-59.
376. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, §
405(b)(2), 115 Stat. 230 (2001).
377. Id. § 407.

378. Interim Rule, supra note 251, at 66,276.
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problems-problems that are inherent in mass-tort litigation generally-by enacting
a uniform body of federal substantive tort law that would cover the issues likely to
arise in the September- I 1-based toxic-tort litigation. The issues likely to arise include
the applicable standards of conduct and issues of liability, proof, and causation.
Although Congress has historically balked at preempting state tort law, in recent years
it has shown a willingness to undertake incremental federalization of substantive tort
law. This new political climate, combined with the uniquely national interests that will
be involved in September-I 1-inspired litigation, make incremental federalization of
substantive tort law covering future toxic-tort litigation a viable and necessary option.
CONCLUSION

To solve the choice-of-law problems that will likely result from future SeptemberS1-based mass toxic-tort litigation, Congress should establish a body of federal
substantive mass-tort law to handle this litigation. Specifically, Congress should either
1) enact substantive tort law that would cover the future toxic-tort litigation, or 2)
amend the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act to bring future
toxic-tort plaintiffs under the control of the Fund and direct the Justice Department to
promulgate regulations creating substantive and procedural standards by which to
evaluate and administratively adjudicate the toxic-tort claims.

